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1. Introduction 
Various reforms in the water sector—including at the river basin level—have been implemented in 
recent years in many countries.
1  This has come following the increased awareness and concerns of 
both policy makers and water users regarding the state of water.  One of the major components of 
these reforms at the basin level is the decentralization of management to the lowest appropriate level, as 
widely advocated in the Dublin Principles (ICWE 1992, p 4) and in the World Bank’s Water 
Resources Policy Paper (1993, p 18), and the Global Water Partnership Working Paper (GWP, 
2000).  The lowest appropriate level usually implies the involvement of different stakeholders in the 
basin, including water users, in order to achieve a more sustainable management of the basin’s water 
resources.
2   
  Early approaches to river basin management took an essentially scientific and engineering 
perspective to optimize water resources development and water allocation.  Over time, while some 
efforts succeeded, many were “disappointing,” as Barrow (1998) concluded.  This, and the growing 
scope of river basin management—to include, for example, ecosystem preservation—led to the call 
for decentralization to the lowest appropriate level as a means for harnessing local initiatives and 
creating coalitions for development.  In fact, of the several documented reforms of river basin 
management, both decentralization and performance are concepts that are hard to evaluate.  A 
review of the literature on decentralization in the water sector (Mody, 2004) suggests that not many 
analyses of decentralization of river basin management functions have been undertaken yet, and that 
this topic is also relatively recent.  Recent works have focused mainly on surveys of efforts at the 
national level to implement Integrated Water Resources Management (GWP, 2004). 
  The fact that there are only a few documented works of the experiences regarding the 
process and impact of decentralization in river basins around the world points to a major gap in our 
knowledge about the costs and benefits of the decentralization.  The few analyses and case studies 
that particularly deal with decentralization include: the Curu, Jaguaribe and Metropolitana River 
Basins in Brazil (Kemper and Olson, 2000), the Yellow River Basin in China (Zusman, 1998), 
                                                 
1 In this paper we do not question the challenges river basin management poses, and the reasons for decentralization, 
but take decentralization as an objective by itself.  For a justification for the decentralization approach see Blomquist et 
al. (2005). 
2 There could be several definitions for decentralization such as the general definition of delegation of decision making 
from higher to lower level entity.  But we prefer the combination of increased transparency and involvement in decision 
making of stakeholders, as it provides a wider basis for measuring decentralization.  Our definition of decentralization 
and it rationale are elaborated in the theory section of the paper.  5
Lerma-Chapala Basin in Mexico (Reynoso, 2000; Merrey, 2000), the São Francisco Basin in Brazil 
(Ioris, 2001), the Bicol Basin in the Philippines (Koppel, 1987), the Olifants Basin in South Africa 
(Merrey, 2000), and the Cross Basin in Nigeria (Udofia, 1988).  For a summary of major 
components of the decentralization reform in these basins, see Mody (2004).  To address this issue 
in a more comprehensive manner, a research study was developed that would (i) carry out eight 
additional case study analyses and (ii) undertake a global survey of river basin organizations. The 
eight case studies were completed recently, employing a single analytical framework, as part of the 
study “Integrated River Basin Management and the Principle of Managing Water Resources at the 
Lowest Appropriate Level – When and Why Does It (Not) Work in Practice?” that was funded by 
the World Bank.  The eight case studies are: the Guadalquivir Basin in Spain (Blomquist et al., 2004), 
the Warta Basin in Poland (Blomquist, et al., 2004), the Brantas Basin in Indonesia (Bhat ey al., 
2004), the Tárcoles Basin in Costa Rica (Blomquist et al., 2004), the Murray Darling Basin in 
Australia (Blomquist et al., 2004), the Fraser Basin in Canada (Blomquist et al., 2004), and the Alto 
Tietê and Jaguaribe Basins in Brazil (Formiga and Kemper, 2005; and Formiga and Kemper, 2005). 
  While the case study analyses cited in Mody (2004) and the recent eight case studies 
mentioned above shed light on the direction of development in river basin decentralization, these do 
not yet permit the identification of generic reasons and forces behind decentralization, of process 
characterization and of success levels, just because the focus was on individual case study 
description.  A more analytical approach would allow finding general relationships and patterns.  For 
that one needs to have a framework that incorporates the political, institutional and economic 
variables and the paths by which they may influence decentralization outcome.  Such framework also 
needs to take into account the initial and contextual conditions.  An important consideration in this 
context is that “the lowest appropriate level” for integrated river basin management varies between 
basins, i.e. while full decentralization of decision-making can be optimal in one case, it can be 
destructive in another one.  For this reason, the methodology necessarily needs to take into account 
hydrological, socio-economic, cultural and historical conditions in each basin (see also Saleth and 
Dinar, 2004). 
  In this paper we use the theory that has been developed within the research project and 
expand it to explain levels of success of decentralization processes in river basins and apply it to the 
global data collected from river basins around the world.  The next section presents the theory and 
the hypotheses we plan to test.  The third section presents the process of data collection and the  6
quality assurance methods employed.  As the data that were collected were very comprehensive, we 
also explain procedures used in manipulating the data for purposes of aggregating variables.  Section 
4 depicts and justifies the empirical models we constructed and section 5 reports the results of the 
analysis.  The conclusion suggests lessons for both researchers dealing with assessing progress in 
institutional reform and policy makers dealing with river basin management and other related 
sectors. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses  
We follow the analytical framework suggested by Blomquist et al, (2005) that uses concepts such as 
incentives for stakeholders
3 to act (e.g. the government to decentralize, the water users and other 
stakeholders to take on responsibilities), principal-agent relationships (referring to the transparency and 
enforcement possibilities in contractual agreements between the stakeholders to carry out certain 
functions), transaction costs (in terms of time and money to achieve institutional change) as well as the 
level of influence, determined inter alia by the degree of information asymmetry,  between different actors 
and social groups. 
  In addition to the specific local context of the decentralization process, an important issue to 
be addressed is what to measure and how to measure.  Decentralization of decision-making is not an 
aim per se.  It is recommended because experience over the past decades has shown that when 
decision-making is centralized and local conditions are not taken appropriately into account, then 
accountability of decision makers is weak, and water resources management is inadequate.  Thus, it 
is necessary to develop indicators to (a) define decentralization as a concept and (b) define and 
measure changes in water resources management outcomes when the institutional arrangements 
have changed.   
  We start with a proposed definition of decentralization, which is based on (a) an increase in 
transparency in decision making and (b) a substantial increase in stakeholder involvement in decision 
making, including measures to accord financial self-sufficiency.  Acknowledging that each case is 
different, the baseline used for analysis would be the intention to decentralize as expressed by 
legislation in a certain country and by the initial statement of objectives of the respective 
organization that is being analyzed.  The implementation of this intention would then be evaluated 
                                                 
3 Stakeholders in the basin may include individuals, groups and governments (from local to federal).  7
by taking into account (a) the existing institutional framework, (b) the process, (c) the political 
economy and (d) the results.   
Decentralization can be seen as a reform process and as such, other processes that take place 
in parallel may affect it.  Forces initiating and affecting the decentralization process stem from 
societal structure: the initiation of the process, the interests leading to the reform (top down or 
bottom up), rules governing the initiation and approval of organizational change, etc.  These are 
discussed at length in Blomquist et al. (2005).  Furthermore, the concept of path dependency plays a 
major role in the process of institutional reform (Saleth and Dinar, 2004:264).  The process by which 
decentralization measures are introduced is expected to affect implementation, and thus 
performance, and therefore needs to be taken into account.  The costs and benefits encountered by 
different stakeholders as well as power relations between them are also considered as important 
variables in our analytical framework (Saleth and Dinar, 2004:Chapter 4). 
  As institutional analysts have studied natural resource management in general—and in some 
instances, water resource management in particular—they have identified patterns that either 
encourage or inhibit the constructive coordination of individuals’ behavior.  Much of this work is 
summarized in Bromley (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994).  An 
extensive literature review can be found in Dinar and Saleth (2004, Chapter 3).  Among the key 
considerations identified in these literatures are: asymmetries of power, information, or other 
resources distribution among individuals; the history of past interactions among individuals and their 
anticipations concerning future interactions; the extent to which individuals are allowed or 
encouraged to innovate, experiment, and pursue trial-and-error learning with respect to institutional 
arrangements; social (or otherwise derived) norms of trust and reciprocity; and cultural or other 
differences among the individuals who are attempting to coordinate behavior or whose cooperation 
is needed.  For this study, we have operationalized those broad categories into empirical variables, 
and formulated hypotheses about how each variable might contribute to the likelihood of successful 
or unsuccessful decentralization of river basin management. 
2.1 The Hypotheses 
For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, we assume that “management at the lowest 
appropriate level” usually implies the active involvement of different stakeholders, including users, at 
various levels related to the river basin.  Appropriate in this context implies that not all stakeholders 
need to be involved in all decisions and management activities, but that this is a flexible concept,  8
which would be adapted to each riverbasin, depending on local conditions.  But increasing 
stakeholder involvement is not the end of the inquiry, and there are several important related 
questions.  If such active involvement of stakeholders is secured, how can it be translated into 
effective resource management and high performance level?  What factors might we expect to affect 
the likelihood of stakeholder involvement turning into effective basin-level resource management (as 
distinct from mere stakeholder consultation, or the collapse of stakeholder involvement)?  If 
stakeholder involvement is translated into basin-level management, how can the active involvement 
and the effective resource management be sustained over time and changing conditions?  What 
factors might account for the longevity of decentralized arrangements in some cases and their 
demise in others? 
  Guided by these research questions, we developed a theory, which identifies a set of 
empirical variables with hypotheses about their impact on the process of decentralization of river 
basin management and its performance.  Those variables and hypotheses incorporate ideas identified 
in a literature review we conducted on decentralization in various sectors (Mody, 2004), as well as 
the literature on institutional analysis concerning collective action, central government-local 
government relationships, principal-agent relationships, and natural resource management.  They are 
used here for translating the theory to empirical hypotheses.  The following discussion presents our 
empirical hypotheses to be tested and the empirical variables.  We have four sets of variables 
identified under the major headings: 
1.  Impact of contextual factors and initial conditions 
2.  Characteristics of the decentralization process 
3.  Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
4.  The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements. 
  For each set we develop a list of empirical variables that could capture the expected relationship. 
Impact of Contextual Factors and Initial Conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that the outcome of 
decentralization is partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time a decentralization 
initiative is attempted (path dependency).  These initial conditions are elements of the economic,  9
political and social context of the decentralization effort.  Several variables that could capture such 
conditions are listed below. 
Level of economic development in the nation measures the ability of the government to financially 
support the initial stages of the decentralization process.  Although a decentralization initiative may 
be undertaken with the expectation to reduce the central government’s financial outlays for river 
basin management, the early stages of decentralization may require some additional outlays in order 
to make the transition.  Central government assistance to basin stakeholders in establishing some of 
the basin-level organizations and practices could be essential.  Furthermore, successful 
decentralization does not mean terminating all central government functions in the area of water 
resource management.  Aspects of water resource management that have the characteristics of 
“public goods” may be provided by a central government, even while additional aspects of water 
management are devolved. 
  Therefore, the level of economic development of the nation is an important contextual 
variable, to the extent that it affects the financial capacity of the central government to bear both the 
transition costs of the decentralization initiative and the ongoing costs of the central functions that 
support and facilitate basin-scale water resource management.  All other things being equal, we would 
expect decentralization initiatives to be more likely to achieve sustainable success where the economic well-being of the 
nation allows the central government to bear those costs. 
Level of economic development of the river basin region measures the ability of the basin 
stakeholders to commit financial and other resources necessary to the decentralization process in 
addition to central government provision of support for the decentralization effort.  The literature 
on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful decentralization must include 
some degree of financial autonomy (Cerniglia, 2003; Musgrave, 1997).  Sustaining this financial 
autonomy often depends upon the establishment of some form of water pricing or tariffs, having 
the users obeying such payments, and having the proceeds remain within or return to the basin. 
  Thus, decentralizing management to the basin level, developing and maintaining the 
institutional arrangements for basin-level management, and implementing any form of financial 
autonomy imply that some financial resources at the basin level will have to be committed to the 
decentralization effort.  This in turn implies that basins that have a level of economic development which can 
sustain those resource commitments are (all other things being equal) more likely to achieve sustainable success in 
decentralization.  10
Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders is an important contextual factor in the 
development and successful implementation of a decentralization initiative.  This variable has 
interesting and complex properties, however.  On the one hand and more obviously, extreme 
disparities in resource endowments among basin stakeholders can imperil decentralization success.  
If some privileged stakeholders may anticipate being worse off, they are unlikely to support the 
decentralization process and may even try to derail it.  And if other stakeholders are so destitute as 
to be unable to bring any resources of their own to the decentralization initiative, they may rationally 
elect not to participate even though more effective resource management would promise to improve 
their situation in the long run.  On the other hand and less obviously, some inequality of initial 
resource endowments may facilitate action by enabling some stakeholders to bear the costs of taking 
a leadership role (Blomquist, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). 
  Thus, some inequality of resource endowments is not necessarily lethal to a decentralization 
initiative, and may even facilitate it if better-situated users are willing to lead.  Extreme inequality, 
however, may be detrimental or even derail the decentralization effort.  The distribution of resource 
endowments among the basin stakeholders is therefore an important contextual variable affecting 
the prospects for successful decentralization.  We hypothesize that the relationship between level of inequality 
of resource endowments and successful decentralization is quadratic, with greatest positive impact at a certain level of 
inequality and lower or negative impacts at both lower and higher levels of inequality of resource endowment 
distribution. 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Certain conditions or characteristics of the decentralization process itself may affect the prospects 
for successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are (a) a 
devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) an acceptance of that authority 
and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) both occur will depend in part 
upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Below is a list of variables and their expected 
impact. 
Top-down, bottom-up, or mutually desired devolution are ways of characterizing the 
decentralization initiative.  In some cases, central government officials may have undertaken 
resource management decentralization initiatives in order to solve their own problems—e.g., to 
reduce or eliminate the central government’s political accountability for past or current resource 
policy failures, resolve a budgetary crisis by cutting their financial responsibility for selected domestic  11
policy areas (Simon 2002), respond to pressure from external support agencies to formulate a 
decentralization initiative as a condition of continued receipt of financial support, etc.  In other cases 
it is “bottom up” pressure from the stakeholders that leads to the decentralization (Samad, 2005).  In 
still other cases, the decision to decentralize resource management to a lower and more appropriate 
level may have been the outcome of a process of mutual discussion and agreement between central 
officials hoping to improve policy outcomes and local stakeholders desiring greater autonomy 
and/or flexibility. 
  Using the data we collect, we therefore attempt to identify the motivation and process by 
which the decentralization initiative came to pass. And, all other things being equal, we can anticipate that 
because decentralization initiatives require active basin-level stakeholder involvement, they are more likely to be 
implemented successfully if undertaken under the latter circumstances than under the former. 
Existing local-level governance arrangements contribute to continuation.  The literature suggests 
that decentralization initiatives are more likely to be accompanied by active involvement of basin 
stakeholders if existing community (village, tribe) governance institutions and practices are 
recognized and incorporated in the decentralization process.  This observation has a transactions 
costs explanation, too: the costs (primarily in terms of time and effort) to basin stakeholders of 
relating on familiar organizational forms are expected to be smaller than the costs of relating to an 
additional set of organizational arrangements.  In contrast, decentralization initiatives that feature 
central government construction of new sets of basin-level organizations that are largely separate 
from existing and traditional community governance institutions may face higher costs in achieving 
basin stakeholders’ participation, resource commitments, and acceptance of decisions as legitimate.  
This does not mean that no new institutions will have to be created in order to achieve basin-scale 
management—in fact, new institutions will often be needed to promote communication and 
integrate decision making across communities within a river basin.  Rather, all other things being equal, 
decentralization initiatives are more likely to succeed in gaining stakeholder acceptance if they are based upon, and 
constructed from, traditional community governance institutions and practices, i.e. take account of existing social 
capital. 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central government and 
local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be expected to affect that success.  
Accordingly, our study includes a set of political and institutional variables having to do with the  12
respective capacities of the central government and the basin-level stakeholders, and with the 
relationship between them, as can be seen below. 
The extent of devolution of responsibilities and decision making.  A decentralization policy initiative 
announced by a central government may be only symbolic, while the central government retains in 
practice control over all significant resource management decisions.  Worse still, a decentralization 
policy can represent an abandonment of central government responsibility for resource management 
without a concomitant establishment of local level authority.  In better situations, the central 
government transfers degrees of both authority and responsibility for resource management to the 
stakeholders. 
  These differences in the extent of actual devolution can be expected to affect the prospects 
for successful implementation of the decentralization policy.  Symbolic or abandonment policies are 
at best unlikely to improve resource management, and at worst will undermine stakeholder 
willingness to commit to and sustain the extent of active involvement necessary for successful 
decentralization.  All other things being equal, we would expect to see greater prospects for success increasing with 
level of devolution. 
Financial autonomy and financial resources at the basin level reflect ability to implement 
decentralization.  Decentralization of water resource management to the lowest appropriate level 
means at least some financial responsibilities are undertaken by basin-level organizations.  If basin-
level stakeholders lack any autonomy to determine how funds shall be spent on resource 
management activities, the question is begged whether any meaningful decentralization has occurred.  
And certainly the “active involvement of stakeholders” implies to some degree that they commit 
some of their own financial resources to their resource management functions.  On the other hand, 
decentralization does not have to mean that basin-level organizations and their members become 
solely responsible for all resource management funding.  As already noted, one of the indicators of 
central government support for a decentralization policy can be the central government’s willingness 
to provide financial assistance to basin-level organizations without maintaining intrusive control 
over basin-level decisions about the priorities on which those funds shall be spent. 
  Therefore, while logic and experience suggest that basin-level organizations must have some 
degree of financial autonomy and some extent of financial resources in order for decentralization 
initiatives to be implemented successfully, the impact may not be linear.  Rather, all other things being  13
equal, we would expect to see the prospects for a success hill shaped with complete central government funding and 
control at one pole and complete basin-level funding and control at the opposite pole. 
Local autonomy in institutional reform is the extent to which local communities can design and 
implement their own institutional arrangements.  It is a key element to the success of 
decentralization.  Successful implementation of decentralization is likely to be a function of that 
local autonomy, because implementation costs are closely associated with information that is better 
obtained at local level, and also because stakeholder involvement is expected to be greater in crafting 
their own institutions.  However, as stakeholders create more institutional arrangements (particularly 
organizations and agencies), they incur greater transaction costs of maintaining all of them and 
coordinating their activities. 
  Plainly, the effects of local autonomy are complex, but it is a critical institutional variable in 
relation to the prospects for successful implementation of water resource management 
decentralization.  All other things being equal, we expect to find successful and sustainable implementation of 
decentralization initiatives more often in settings where local-level stakeholders are empowered to craft institutional 
arrangements for resource management at the basin and sub-basin levels (including cross-jurisdictional arrangements), 
and modify them as needed. 
Local-level experience with self-governance and service provision.  In any country, the 
decentralization of water resource management does not occur in a vacuum.  The ability of central 
government officials to strike a balance between supportiveness and intrusiveness, and the capacity 
of basin-level stakeholders to organize and sustain institutional arrangements, will in part be a 
function of their experiences with respect to other public services or responsibilities.  The ability of 
central and local participants to perform successfully will depend on the skills and experiences they 
have developed. 
  We would expect that water resource management decentralization initiatives are more likely to be 
implemented successfully in settings where local participants have experience in governing and managing other resources 
and/or public services—e.g., land uses, schooling, transportation, etc.   
Economic, political and social differences among basin users.  In many countries, the distribution of 
political influence will be a function of economic, religious, or other social and cultural distinctions.  
But even if it were not for the connection between these characteristics and political influence, the 
characteristics themselves can affect successful implementation of decentralization initiatives,  14
through their independent effects on stakeholder communication, trust, and extent of experience in 
interdependent endeavors.   
  Economic, political, and social distinctions among basin-level stakeholders are likely to affect 
the implementation of decentralized resource management efforts.  The greater and more contentious these 
distinctions, all other things being equal, the more difficult it will be to develop and sustain basin-scale institutional 
arrangements for governing and managing water resources.   
  It is important to add that  these are empirical, not prescriptive, observations.  Central 
government officials cannot make distinctions among basin-level stakeholders disappear.  Nor 
should central government officials selectively apply decentralization policies only in relatively 
homogeneous settings.  
Adequate time for implementation and adaptation.  While it is obvious that longevity of water 
resource management arrangements may reflect their success, it may be less obvious that their 
success may depend on their longevity.  Time is needed to develop basin-scale institutional 
arrangements, to experiment with alternatives and engage in some trial-and-error learning.  Time is 
needed for trust building, so water users begin to accept new arrangements and gradually commit to 
sustaining them.  Time is needed also to translate resource management plans into observable and 
sustained effects on resource conditions.   
  The relationship between time and success in water resource management is complicated.  
On the one hand, we have already said that adaptability is important—water users need to be able to 
modify institutional arrangements in response to changed conditions.  On the other hand, patience 
is important, too—changing institutions quickly because a new approach has not succeeded can 
simply erode stakeholders’ willingness to commit their time and effort to the next reform.  We may 
observe a curvilinear relationship, in which successful implementation is less likely to be observed among 
decentralization initiatives that are very young, but is more likely at longer periods, but could taper off if central 
government and basin-level arrangements have proved insufficiently adaptable over long periods. 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management may also depend on 
features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or by the central government, 
as is captured by the variables below.    15
Presence of basin-level governance institutions may be a prerequisite for successful water resource 
management.  Sustained and effective participation of stakeholders presupposes the existence of 
arrangements by which stakeholders articulate their interests, share information, communicate and 
bargain, and take collective decisions.  Basin-level governance is essential to the ability of water users 
to operate at multiple levels of action, which is a key to sustained successful resource preservation 
and efficient use (Ostrom, 1990). 
  Basin-level water resource management (in other words, a decentralized system) is neither 
achievable nor sustainable without the establishment and maintenance of basin-level governance 
arrangements.  Because the existence of governance arrangements is a necessary, not sufficient, condition of successful 
resource management, we should not expect to find success everywhere we find basin-level governance institutions, but we 
should expect to find failure everywhere they are absent. 
Recognition of sub-basin communities of interest.  The water management issues in the basin are 
viewed differently by the stakeholders that share the resource in various parts of the basin, based 
mainly on the physical conditions and spatial situation of each group.  For example, downstream 
users’ perspectives on water quality differ from upstreamers.  Users with access to groundwater have 
different views of drought exposure than surface water users.  Municipal and industrial water users 
do not perceive the value of assured water supply reliability in the same fashion that agricultural 
water users do (Blomquist and Schlager, 1999).  Thus, while basin-level governance and 
management arrangements are essential to decentralized water resource management, the ability of 
sub-basin stakeholders to address sub-basin issues may be as important. 
  Level of participation of various groups in basin-level decision making arrangements 
explains the direction and extent of the decentralization process.  Of course, transaction costs of the 
decentralization process increase as such assurances are institutionalized, since a larger number of 
stakeholder organizations within the basin will bring greater coordination costs.  All other things being 
equal, we would expect that successful implementation of basin decentralization has a positive relationship with level of 
participation of stakeholders in the process.  However, with diverse and large number of stakeholders high 
transaction costs may become a constraint.  Here too, then, a hill-shaped relation of this variable to successful 
decentralization may be expected, with the absence of sub-basin organizations and large numbers of sub-basin 
organizations negatively associated with lower success and greater prospects for success in between. 
Information sharing and communication.  The importance of information—more particularly, 
information symmetry—and opportunities for communication to the emergence and maintenance  16
of cooperative decision making is relatively well understood.  In water resource management 
especially, where there can be so many indicators of water resource conditions and the performance 
of management efforts, forums for information sharing are vital to reducing information 
asymmetries and promoting cooperation. 
  Since information will not automatically be perceived the same way by all stakeholders, and 
the implications of information about resource conditions will differ among these groups, it is 
arguably as important that there also be institutionalized or other regular forums in which basin 
stakeholders can communicate.  All other things being equal, we expect to find successful decentralized water 
resource management more likely where information sharing and communication among stakeholders  are more 
apparent. 
Mechanisms for conflict resolution are needed to prevent disagreements from arising.  Resource 
users can and will disagree about how well their interests are being represented and protected, about 
how well the resource management program is working and whether it is time for a change, about 
the distribution of benefits and costs, and manifold other issues.   
The success and sustainability of decentralized resource management efforts therefore also 
depend on the presence of forums for addressing conflicts.  All other things being equal, we would expect 
successful implementation of decentralized water resource management more likely in settings where forums for conflict 
resolution exist. 
3. The data collection and quality assurance process 
The above analytical framework was applied, using a comprehensive dataset of 83 river basin 
organizations.  A survey instrument was developed and applied to river basins of the International 
Network of Basin Organizations (INBO) as well as to other river basin organizations that have been 
identified  The instrument (Annex 4) provides the necessary data to be used in the empirical analysis.   
3.1 River basin organization data collection process 
The survey instrument was developed and was pre-tested on 25 RBOs prior to being modified and 
finalized.  The survey questions correspond to the list of the variables that were presented in the 
Methodology section.  The survey was administered by INBO (Annex 1), although several 
questionnaires were administered directly by the team data processors.  Questionnaires in English,  17
Spanish, French and Portuguese were sent to 197 RBOs around the world.  In addition to hand mail 
and email, a website was created for the study, on which the survey was posted,
4 with the capability 
of accommodating an online response.  The data collection was completed after an iterative process 
of data acquisition and quality assurance reviews.  The process involved the compilation of 
qualitative and quantitative data from a questionnaire, which INBO and data processors distributed.   
Responses from 103 (52% response rate) were obtained.  After reviewing all responses for 
relevance (non transboundary rivers)
5 and completeness and accuracy of data, 83 responses were 
included in the final dataset.  To our knowledge this is the largest dataset of information about river 
basin organizations worldwide that is currently in existence.  A tally of the survey responses is 
provided in Table 1. 
  Coordination between the data processors and INBO was very crucial for obtaining the final 
dataset (See Annex 1 for INBO’s report).  All responses were checked both by INBO and the data 
processors, for errors, which were critical to the study, such as missing answers to questions, which 
respondents for one reason or another did not or could not answer.  In such cases, an attempt was 
made to identify parties who could respond comprehensively to the question(s).  In addition to such 
a check, a further rudimentary statistical test was made on most variables, to identify outliers within 
the given responses.  These were brought to the attention of the respondents and in the case of 
errors and/or mistakes efforts were made towards correction.  Figure 1 is a flow chart summarizing 







                                                 
4 www.worldbank.org/riverbasinmanagement 
5 Transboundary riverbasin processes are significantly different from institutional processes in national basins. For this 
reason, the decision was taken to not include transboundary basins in the analysis.  Three basins that could be 
considered transboundary were included, however, because they were either mostly contained in one country or featured 
a river basin organization that had been developed only in one country.     18
































FILLED OUT ON 
WEBSITE OR BY HAND 
















NO  NO  19
Table 1: The distribution of responses and data collection efforts by continents 
Continent  Questionnaires 
sent 
Responses  Eliminated  Retained in the data 
set 
Africa & Middle East 18  14 2 12  (66)
a
Latin America  118  37 2 35 (30)
North America  5  5 0 5 (100)
East Asia-Pacific  7  7 3 4 (57)
Europe 49  40 13 27  (26)
Total 197  103 20 83  (42)
a In parentheses are percent of retained questionnaires from the number that were sent. 
Distributional Facts of the Sample RBOs 
The 83 retained questionnaires do reflect a representative distribution of river basin organizations 
(Table 2) both across continents and with regard to several basic characteristics.  Latin America and 
Europe, which are the leading regions in reforms of river basin management, capture 75% of the 
sample RBOs.
6 
Table 2: Regional distribution of the sample RBOs 









Number of Basins  4  12  27  35  5  83 
Share (rounded)  4.8  14.5  32.5  42.2  6.0  100.0 
 
  Looking at the year when sample RBOs were established suggests that 47 (57%) of the 
sample RBOs were established in the last 15 years, ten of which (12%) were established in the last 4 
years.  Table 3 provides the detailed distribution by decade. 
Table 3: Distribution of RBOs by decade of their creation 



















2 1 0 1  17  2 7  37  10  77a 
%  2.6 1.3 0.0 1.3  22.1  2.6 9.1  48.0  13.0  100.0 
a Several RBOs could not identify exactly the year of their creation. 
                                                 
6 We are aware of the fact that our sample might be biased towards the ‘French model’ of basin management, as many of 
the basins that have been surveyed are basins that adopted the French system of river basin management.  20
Of the 83 basins, 32 are located in developed countries and 51 are located in developing 
countries.  These basins were within the borders of 27 countries.  The basin area distribution 
indicates that 24 (28.9%) basins comprise an area of less than 10,000 km
2, 56 (67.5%) basins 
comprise an area of between 10,000-1,000,000 km
2, and 3 (3.6%) basins cover an area greater than 1 
million km
2.  The population distribution indicates that more than 54 (65.1%) of the river basins in 
the dataset have populations ranging from 1 to 10 million. About 10 (12.0%) of the basins have 
populations of more than 10 million inhabitants, and 19 (22.9%) having less than 1 million 
inhabitants.   
  Mean year of creation of basins in developed countries was 1979, with many basins created 
as early as 1961.   Mean year of creation for basins in developing countries  was ten years later, in 
1989, with one basin created as early as 1927.  It does not appear that the governing body of the 
river basin organization is related to whether the basin is in a developing or a developed country.   
We conducted a preliminary analysis of basic correlations among key variables to find   
whether there are some a-priori relationships that we should pay attention to.  For example, we were 
interested in seeing whether developing countries are different than developed ones.  Do developing 
countries have longer processes of decentralization?  Do they end up with a different governing 
body of the basin organization? Do they have inferior performance of the decentralization process 
compared to the developed countries?  We could not find a significant difference between 
developed and developing countries with regard to these questions.  We concluded, consistent with 
our analytical framework, that what actually affects the process and performances are the contextual 
and initial conditions on the one hand and the characteristics of central government/basin-level 
relationships and capacities on the other.  Therefore, we did not include in our empirical analysis any 
dummy to distinguish between developed and developing countries.   
3.2 Data manipulation 
The questionnaire consists of 47 questions and the number of variables based on these questions is 
226.  They are divided into four groups, namely (a) general data variables that provide information 
on the RBO’s contact information, (b) institutional setup variables that describe various aspects of 
the institutional arrangements in the basin before and after the decentralization process, (c) finance 
variables addressing aspects of the RBO’s budget, and (d) performance indicators that measure 
various performances of the RBO.  A detailed explanation and description of each variable is 
provided in Annex 2.    21
  As can be seen from the list of questions (Annex 4) and the list of variables that were 
extracted from the questionnaire (Annex 2), some of the questions provided a vector of variables 
that could be correlated as well as having a joint effect as explanatory variables in a regression 
equation.  In such cases a Principal Component (PC) Analysis was performed and the set of 
variables in question were converted into one PC variable. 
  Another type of manipulation of the variables is the creation of indices to reflect values that 
are better expressed on a per unit basis rather than an absolute scale.  It also should be mentioned 
that several questions were not answered by all RBOs and thus, several variables have a significant 
number of missing values and cannot be used.  The original and newly created variables that were 
selected for inclusion in the analysis are presented in Annex 3, along with the hypotheses regarding 
their impact on the decentralization process. 
  In the next section we embark on the empirical analyses, which include several procedures 
and sets of equations to understand the process and the performance of decentralization and the 
interaction between them. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section provides the general framework for the econometric analysis of the data that was 
collected from river basins around the world.  The framework is based on the theory and hypotheses 
described earlier, and on the hypotheses set, with empirical specifications adjusted to the variables 
that were prepared. 
4.1 The empirical models 
We are interested in two types of relationships.  The first is a relationship that explains a certain 
phenomenon in the basin, such as specifics of the decentralization process, measured by the levels 
of P.  The second is a relationship that explains level of success/progress of the decentralization 
process, measured by S.   
  The set of equations used in the estimation of the first relationship takes the following 
shape: 
[1] P =g(C, R, I | X) 
where 
P  is a vector of characteristics of the decentralization process;  22
C  is a vector of contextual factors and initial conditions; 
R is a vector of characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities; 
I  is a vector of internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements;  
X is a vector of ‘other’ variables, identified as necessary, 
A general relationship for decentralization success/progress, using the theory developed 
above is as follows: 
[2] S=f(C, P, R, I | X), where 
S is a measure of success/progress of the performance of the decentralization of management in the 
river basin.  We have several measures of success and several measures for levels of progress of the 
decentralization, as was discussed in detail in previous sections. 
  Note that equations [1] and [2] could be estimated as a system, relying on the fact that P, 
which is a dependent variable in [1], serves as an independent variable in [2], thus creating the 
necessary link between the equation that describes the nature of the decentralization process ([1]), 
and the equation that describes the performance of the decentralization reform ([2]).  The equation 
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with all parameters having the same meaning as in equations [1] and [2]. 
We propose several types of specification of the functional form depending on the nature of 
the variable S.  Based on our discussion in previous sections, one possible way to measure success is 
by using a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when decentralization was initiated and 0 
when no decentralization took place in spite of government intent.   
A second way of describing success is to measure normatively the extent of achieving several 
important original goals of the decentralization process.  In this case the various RBOs have been 
ranked on a scale ranging from s to s  in terms of the decentralization success, which allows S to get 
more than 2 values.   
A third way of measuring progress of decentralization is by comparing performance between 
present and the pre-decentralization period.  Performance variables may include: level of  23
participation, local responsibility, financial performance, economic activity etc.  Using this definition, 
S becomes a continuous variable.   
4.2 Empirical specifications of the decentralization process and its performance 
We start our investigation with specification of relationships explaining the characteristics of the 
decentralization process (equation [1]).  Several variables could help shed light on the 
decentralization process.  Few are probably of special interest as they contrast observations across 
river basin decentralization processes under a variety of situations.  The length of the 
decentralization process, YrsDecentralization, the transaction costs of the process, measured by several 
variables such as InstDismntld, InstCreatn, PltclCost, and the level of involvement of the stakeholders, 
WuasInvlv, are a few that caught our attention.  Estimation procedure explaining YrsDecentralization 
uses a TOBIT procedure as values are continuous between 0-100.  Estimation procedures explaining 
InstDismntld,  InstCreatn, and PltclCost use a GLM procedure as these are string variables.  And 
estimation procedures explaining YrsDecentralization use an OLS procedure as values of that variable 
are continuous (excluding zeroes).  Table 4 summarizes the functional forms of the various 
equations we specified for estimating relationship [1] and the expected impact on the dependent 
variable. 
We identified several variables that serve to measure decentralization success or progress.  
The estimates of relationships using the first two approaches (that have been mentioned earlier) to 
measuring success/progress imply having possibly zeros in the dependent variable and thus, a Logit, 
Tobit and GLM estimation procedures are necessary (Madalla, 1989).  To be more specific, we use 
the dichotomous variable InstCng to measure whether or not an institutional change has occurred, 
and applied a Logit procedure to estimate that relationship.  We use the two variables SuccObj1 and 
SuccObj2 to reflect achievement of various goals the decentralization process was aimed to achieve.  
We applied both a TOBIT and GLM procedures to estimate these relationships.  Both these 
procedures are applied when a dependent variable is truncated varying between 0 and an upper 
value.  However, because we are not sure that these values are distributed normally, we cannot use 
GLM as it may provide a biased estimate.  Thus we also use the TOBIT procedure that assumes a 
Poisson distribution. Finally, we constructed several additional variables, PrblmsAftr, IncrmntTasks, 
IncrmntImprv, and ImprvRespons that are not truncated and thus an OLS estimation procedure is used 
for the estimations of their relationship.  Table 5 summarizes the estimation procedures of the  24
various equations we specified for estimating relationship [2], and the hypothesized directions of 
impact, based on the theory developed earlier. 
Table 4: The estimated equations of the decentralization process
7 
  InstCreatd WuasInvlv  PltclCost YrsDecent  InstDismntld 
%BgtBsn  NI NI  NI  NI + 
%BgtExtr  - NI NI NI NI 
%BgtSpnt  NI  - NI  NI - 
%BgtSrcs  NI -  NI NI NI 
%UsrPay  NI  NI  - - - 
Facilities  NI  NI + NI  NI 
FormsDisput1  NI +  NI NI NI 
FormsDisput2  + NI NI NI NI 
GovrBdy  - - NI - NI 
MainObj  NI  NI  NI + NI 
MinrObj  +  NI - NI  NI 
PrblmsBfr  -  NI - NI  NI 
Scarcity1  NI  NI  NI - NI 
SectrComposit  + + NI  NI + 
ShareSw  + +  + NI NI 
TypesDisput  NI  NI NI NI  - 
WuasInvlv  +   +     
Functional form  GLM  OLS  GLM POISSON GLM 
Note: NI=Not Included 
5. Results 
Due to the large number of variables in the dataset, and the high level of association among many of 
them (leading to high auto-correlation), we administered principal component (PC) analyses that 
helped us group these correlated variables and reduce the number of variables with inter-correlation 
on the right hand side of the estimated equation.  We constructed a working dataset that includes 
the PC variables and some other variables that were incorporated in our regression analyses.  The 
PC variables are described in Annex 3, but the results of the PC analysis are presented below.  
Following the PC results, we present the descriptive statistics of the variables in the working dataset.  
Finally, the Results section is concluded with the various regression outcomes and their 
interpretation. 
 
                                                 
7 Some of the variables presented here are explained in the section “Principal Component Results”.  25
5.1 Principal Component results 
We constructed a total of 15 PC variables that were described in the data manipulation section.  For 
each PC analysis we obtained the following procedure:  Let 
j
k , i ε  be the value of estimated i-th 
component of the j-th eigenvector of PC variable k.  We then calculate the value of variable k as 
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Table 6 below presents the estimated PC coefficients that were used to create the PC 
variables, using the first eigenvector from the PC analysis.  The eigenvectors of the first principal 
components, which were used in the creation of the principal component variables, are presented in 
the table.  These eigenvectors explain between 25 and 99 percent of the standardized variance 
among the variables. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 7 refers to the variables in the working dataset. 
Econometric findings 
The presentation of the econometric results will be split into three sub-sections: the equations 
describing the decentralization process, the equations describing the decentralization performance, 
and the equation systems describing the interaction between the decentralization process and the 
level of performance.  
The decentralization process 
We identified several relationships that could shed light on the characteristics of the decentralization 
process in terms of its length, complexity and participation of stakeholders.  The hypothesized 
relationships between the variables in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 4.  We were able 
to estimate five equations representing various aspects of the decentralization process.  We 
explained institutions that were created, the institutions that were dismantled, the involvement of 
water user groups, the political cost of the decentralization process and the length of the 
decentralization process.  The explanatory variables used in the analysis are generally in line with the 
hypothesized signs.  Certain variables, such as %UsrPay, ShareSW and GovrBdy that were included in  26
more than two equations are significant and their signs are as expected.
8  We also will mention 
results pertaining to variables that were included in one equation only.  Scarcity1 has a significant 
negative impact on the length of the decentralization process with basins facing higher scarcity
9 
perform the decentralization faster than basins with more abundant water.  FormDisput1 stimulates 
involvement of user groups in the process, and existence of Facilities creates higher political cost to 
the decentralization process. 
The decentralization performance 
We present the estimated decentralization performance equations in three tables, using different 
estimation procedures and explanatory and dependent variables (Tabes 9, 10, 11).  Generally 
speaking, the various estimated model equations display a robust set of results that support the 
hypotheses.  All estimated coefficients are significant at the 10 percent and better.  Most variables 
are significant at the 1 percent and better.  Only one coefficient (%BgtBsn) in one equation displays 
the opposite sign to what has been expected.  Fit and significant tests of the models suggest that all 
are significant at 5 percent and less and all except one are significant at 1 percent and less in 
explaining the variation in the level of performance of the decentralization. 
  The main results in Table 9 suggest that the higher the share of the budget that is spent in 
the basin, and the higher the share of the budget that is provided from sources external to the basin 
the higher is the level of the decentralization success; also, the higher the share of users that pay 
their tariffs the higher is the level of the decentralization success.  Two decentralization objectives 
variables also suggest that the more comprehensive the set of objectives that decentralization 
reforms were supposed to address, the higher the success.  In addition, top-down initiation of 
decentralization reform was found to be detrimental for success of the decentralization process. 
Finally, water scarcity level in the basin positively




                                                 
8 Given the nature of the 5 dependent variables we expect to have different signs of the same explanatory variable, 
depending on the equation. 
9 Notice that the lower the ratio of rainfall to evaporation, the higher the scarcity, so a negative sign of the scarcity 
coefficient in the equation reads as a higher level of scarcity. 
10 Notice that the lower the ratio of rainfall to evaporation, the higher the scarcity, so a negative sign of the scarcity 
coefficient in the equation reads as a higher level of scarcity.  27
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%BgtBsn  + NI  NI 
%BgtExtr  + +  NI 
%BgtSpnt  + +  + 
%BgtSrcs  - -  NI 
%UsrPay  + NI  NI 
BgtPrCpta  + NI  NI 
ExistUsrGrp  + +  NI 
Facilities  + NI  NI 
FormsDisput1  + NI  NI 
FormsDisput2  Undecided NI  NI 
GovrBdy  NI -  NI 
InstDismntld  - +  + 
MainObj  + +  NI 
MinrObj  + NI  NI 
MtdCreatn  - NI  NI 
PltclCost  - -  - 
PrblmsBfr  NI +  + 
Scarcity1  - -  - 
SectrComposit  NI -  NI 
SectrUseShars  - NI  NI 
ShareSW  Undecided Undecided  NI 
TypesDisput  - -  NI 
YrCreation  - NI  NI 
YrsDecentralization  - +  NI 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aNote: Var 1-8 constitute different variables, depending on each Principal Component Analysis.  For 
the specific variables in each analysis see Annex 3.  29
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the working dataset 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation Minimum
a Maximum
Scarcity1 5.056 27.965 0.000  246.679
Scarcity2 177.383 1142.484 0.000  10438.417
YrsDecentralization 2.711 7.547 0.000  36.000
YrCreation 1985.229 18.486 1926.000  2002.000
MainObj 1.008 0.692 0.000  1.731
MinrObj 6.208 8.791 0.000  33.972
SuccObj1 3.540 7.814 0.000  63.510
SuccObj2 2.907 2.551 0.000  7.555
GovrBdy 3.566 1.768 0.000  5.000
MtdCreatn 1.193 0.903 0.000  2.000
InstDismntld 0.627 0.837 0.000  3.000
InstCreatd 1.542 1.262 0.000  3.000
PltclCost 0.494 0.942 0.000  5.000
FormsDisput1 2.241 1.265 0.000  4.000
FormsDisput2 0.940 0.502 0.000  2.000
TypesDisput 4.207 2.934 0.000  9.000
Facilities 21.762 263.256 -1410.219  1348.949
SectrComposit 1.257 0.793 0.000  2.183
SectrUseShars 0.299 0.768 -0.425  6.609
ShareSW 0.434 0.381 0.000  1.000
PrblmsBfr 6.871 1.823 0.000  9.750
PrblmsAftr 5.837 1.524 2.334  8.967
IncrmntTasks 0.128 0.371 -2.671  0.762
IncrmntImprv 0.104 0.518 -4.162  0.728
ImprvRespons 1.466 3.639 -8.294  9.217
ExistUsrGrp 0.871 0.783 0.000  1.731
%UsrPay 2.084 13.990 0.000  127.886
BgtPrCpta 0.292 2.658 0.000  24.213
%BgtExtr 0.190 0.328 0.000  1.000
%BgtBsn 0.356 0.391 0.000  1.000
%BgtSrcs -0.115 0.413 -0.713  0.710
%Bgtspnt 0.287 0.474 -0.267  1.370
InstCng 0.627 0.487 0.000  1.000





Table 8: The equations describing some features of the decentralization process 
















%BgtBsn         1.456*** 
(7.08) 
%BgtExtr -1.001*** 
(-3.45)       
%BgtSpnt    -0.093 
(-1.31)     -0.497*** 
(4.45) 
%BgtSrcs    -0.212*** 
(-2.66)      






Facilities     0.001*** 
(2.57)    
FormsDisput1    0.068*** 
(2.53)      
FormsDisput2 0.319* 




(-1.62)    -0.498*** 
(-3.48)   
MainObj       0.510 
(1.05)   
MinrObj 0.016 
(1.44)    -0.011 
(1.31)    
PrblmsBfr -0.056 
(-0.79)    -0.131* 
(-1.63)    
Scarcity1       -0.009*** 











(1.88)    
TypesDisput         -0.063*** 
(-2.76) 
WuasInvlv -0.126 
(-0.36)    0.259 
(0.80)    
Log Pseudolikelihood  -115.59   -105.84  -354.38  -73.37 
F-test   11.01***       
Adjusted-R2   0.423       
Wald Chi-square        28.42***   
Pseudo-R2       0.241   
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
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Table 9: The GLM and TOBIT equations of the Decentralization Performance 
Estimation 
procedure  GLM TOBIT GLM TOBIT 
     Dependent Var. 
Independent 
Var. 






















(1.35)   
%BgtSrcs    -19.373** 
(-2.04)    




BgtPrCpta     -0.155*** 
(-2.56)   
Facilities    0.0004 





(4.24)    
FormsDisput2    0.323** 
(2.24)    
InstDismntld    -0.460*** 



















MtdCreatn    -0.335*** 
(-3.54)    -0.189*** 
(-2.36) 















(-3.22)    
SectrUseShars    0.199** 





(-2.35)    
TypesDisput    -0.129*** 
(-4.43)    
YrCreation    -0.006* 
(-1.55)    
YrsDecentralization    -0.022** 
(-2.12)    
LR Chi-square   392.76***  159.47*** 
R
2 or pseudo R
2   0.593  0.385 
Log Likelihood  -271.69 -167.95 -139.70 -127.27 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.  32
Table 10: The OLS equations of the Decentralization Performance 
Estimation 





















































































































































(-1.00)        
















(2.47)      
















(5.82)        
Scarcity1    -0.001 
(-0.68)    -0.104***
(-2.43)    -0.001*** 
(-2.50)    -0.001***
(-3.01) 




ShareSW     1.640** 
(1.60) 
1.721* 
(1.59)      












(2.39)        
F-test  10.43*** 12.35*** 4.13***  4.46***  8.93*** 3.10** 5.83*** 2.69** 
Adjusted R
2  0.449 0.485 0.162 0.220 0.227 0.258 0.192 0.232 





Table 11: The LOGIT equations of the Decentralization Performance 































Scarcity1    -0.005 
(-0.86) 
LR/Wald Chi-square  23.94*** 22.71*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.222 0.225 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
The interaction between the decentralization process and its level of performance 
In order to assess the impact of the decentralization process on the level of success, we estimated 
several equation systems consisting of two equations.  The first equation depicts the decentralization 
process, as was described in the previous section, and then the dependent process variable was 
included as an instrumental variable in a relationship that describes the performance of the 
decentralization process. 
  Table 12 presents the results of the estimation of system equations that include non OLS 
(GLM and Poisson) estimated decentralization process variables as instrumental variables in the 
decentralization performance equations (that are also GLM and Poisson estimates) in two stages.  
Because there is no procedure to run 2-stage models for GLM and poisson, it was performed 
manually by first estimating models (a), (b) and (c) and then using the predicted values to estimate 
Aa, Ab and Ac.  This does produce the same coefficients but the standard errors are not the same as 
if we were to run a simultaneous 2 stage process.  
  34
Table 12: Results of a manually estimated GLM-Poisson equation system of decentralization 
process-performance  










































































































%Bgtspnt  -0.093** 
(-1.70)    -0.497*** 






%BgtBsn   1.456*** 






%BgtSrcs  -0.212*** 






%UsrPay   0.017*** 
(4.58) 
-0.012*** 






FormsDisput1  0.068*** 






GovrBdy  -0.028* 
(-1.56) 
-0.498*** 






MainObj   0.510 






Scarcity1   -0.009*** 






SectrComposit  -0.006 










ShareSW  0.395*** 
(4.21)     WuasInvolv  1.578 
(0.15)    
TypesDisput     -0.063*** 












































Procedure  GLM Poisson GLM  Estimation 
Procedure  GLM GLM GLM 
Log 
Pseudolikelihood  -6.916    -73.373    -267.49 -267.81 -268.49 
Pseudo R2    0.241         
Wald Chi2   28.42***          
Note:   (1)  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
(2)The equation systems that were estimated consist of equations aA, bB, and cC.  35
  The statistical results follow more or less the lines that were reported in the case of the single 
equation models.  That is, similar signs and sizes of the coefficients of the various equations in the 
system.  However, several of the important coefficients were not significant in the system equation 
compared with the single equation estimates.  These findings hold also for the simultaneously 
estimated equation system reported in Table 13.  We will discuss the meaning of the results in the 
following section. 
Table 13: Results of a simultaneously-estimated OLS equation system of decentralization 
process-performance 
  Equation 1  Equation 2 
  Wuasinvlv PrblmsAfter Wuasinvlv ImprvRespons 





















(-2.94)   
ExistUsrGrp  -0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.415** 
(2.14)    
FormsDisput1  0.076*** 
(2.64)    0.081*** 
(2.91)   





(-1.34)   












PrblmsBfr  0.014 
(0.84) 
0.489*** 
(6.61)    
SectrComposi  -0.018 
(-0.44)    -0.01 
(-0.27)   
ShareSw  0.383*** 




Wuasinvlv   -0.427 
(-0.58)    0.902 
(0.39) 








System F-test  8.75***  2.81*** 
System Adjusted-R
2 0.429  0.167 
Note:    *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
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Table 13 presents the results of a 2-SLS estimation procedure for OLS equations.  As was 
reported for the results of the manually estimated equation system, although the size and direction 
of mainly all coefficients are as expected, several coefficients that were significant in the single 
equation estimates, are not significant in the system equation model.  We will discuss the overall fit 
of the results and their meaning in the following section. 
6. Interpretation of the Results 
In working our way through the results, we follow the set of variables that was the basis for our 
theory and hypotheses.  We report the most robust and relevant results in the analysis.  We group 
the results by the (1) impact of contextual factors and initial conditions, by the (2) characteristics of 
the decentralization process, by the (3) government-basin relationships, and by the (4) internal 
configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements.  The results have to be interpreted in the 
context of a comparative static framework, that is, the impact of a change in the value of one 
variable while holding all other variables constant.  We address additional aspects of handling the 
results in the conclusion section, below. 
 6.1 Impact of contextual factors and initial conditions 
Variables in this group significantly affect the nature of the decentralization process and its 
performance.  Several examples suggest that: 
•  The greater the extent of initial decentralization in the basin, the less time the 
decentralization process took 
•  The greater the reliance on surface water in the basin, the higher the degree of water user 
involvement and participation 
•  The larger the number of institutions that were created during the decentralization process, 
the greater the political transaction costs associated with the process 
•  The greater the number of major problems in the basin prior to decentralization, the greater 
the extent of reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization 
•  The larger the number of institutions that were created during the decentralization process, 
the greater the extent of reported improvement between “before” and “after” 
decentralization.  37
We pay special attention to the water scarcity variable, because it is reflected in many river 
basins around the world and also it fits nicely with the notion of ‘Scarperation’ (Dinar and Dinar, 
2005), which suggests that scarcity is an incentive for cooperation among the parties involved.  And 
indeed the basin water scarcity variable was the most robust variable in the various analyses we 
conducted.  Several of these findings suggest that: 
•  The greater the water scarcity problem in the basin, the less time the decentralization process 
took 
•  The greater the water scarcity in the basin, the greater the extent of reported improvement 
between “before” and “after” decentralization 
•  The greater the water scarcity in the basin, the greater the extent of reported success with 
respect to the major objectives of basin management.  
The starting point and level of the natural resource endowments in the basin matter a great 
deal and thus, where one stands dictates how one should implement the reform and thus, how one 
may end up.  Our take from this set of findings is that rich and well endowed basins do not necessarily have an 
advantage over less endowed basins. Stressed resource conditions and the presence of multiple major problems can be 
stimulants to effective action and not only obstacles.  Approaches for decentralization would address such differences 
and may lead to similar performances.  
6.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
Variables in this group, such as the political economy of the process, participation, compliance, and 
governance level suggest an array of supporting results as follows: 
•  The greater the extent of tariff compliance the lower the political transaction costs of the 
decentralization process; and the smaller the number of institutions that were dismantled 
during the decentralization process 
•  The larger the number of water use sectors present in the basin, the larger the number of 
institutions that were created during the decentralization process 
•  The greater the availability of forums for dispute resolution, the greater the extent of water 
user involvement and participation  38
•  The larger the number of types of disputes in the basin, the greater the extent of reported 
improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization 
•  The larger the number of water use sectors present in the basin, the larger the number of 
institutions that were created during the decentralization process 
•  The greater the political transaction costs associated with the decentralization process, the 
smaller the reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization; and the 
less likely that some form of institutional change was associated with the decentralization 
process 
•  The greater the number of institutions dismantled during the decentralization process, the 
greater the reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization. 
•  The longer the decentralization process took, the greater the extent of reported 
improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization. 
•  The more comprehensive the basin management objectives were, the greater the extent of 
reported success with respect to the major objectives of basin management; the greater the 
reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization. 
  The results associated with this set of variables suggest that indeed political economy plays a 
role in the decentralization process and affects its performance level, by a need for a compromise 
and increased transaction costs.  But a relevant and coherent decentralization agenda proved to be 
effective and successful.  Our take from this set of finding is that diverse and ‘crowded’  basins do not necessarily 
have to face higher political cost and lower levels of performance of the reform, if an appropriate set of mechanisms and 
objectives, such as forums for dispute resolution, and a coherent reform agenda, are put in place at the appropriate time.  
Another important result is that decentralization takes time, and depending on the length of the process, some 
dividends can become evident.  
6.3 Government-basin relationships 
Variables included in this set, such as budget and funding by the government agencies, and the 
initiation of the reform process are also consistent with our expectations.  The common findings 
include: 
•  The larger the share of the RBO budget received from external governmental agencies, the 
smaller the number of institutions that were created during the decentralization process  39
•  The greater the share of the RBO budget coming from external governmental agencies, the 
greater the reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization 
•  The more “top-down” the decentralization process was, the smaller the extent of reported 
success with respect to the major objectives of basin management 
  The results of this group of variables suggest that government support is an important factor 
that has to be included at the right dose.  On the other hand, the experience in the basins we 
analyzed suggest that initiation of the decentralization process by governments is counter productive 
and ends in lower levels of reform performance.  Our take for this group of variables is that Government is 
good as long as it allows the stakeholders to initiate and lead the reform process, with a certain budget support. 
6.4 Internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Under this set of variables we include local configurations such as: presence of user groups, budget 
sources and usage.  Common findings across the regression models suggest that: 
•  The greater the share of the RBO budget contributed by other sources, the smaller the 
extent of water user involvement and participation 
•  The larger the share of the RBO budget collected from basin stakeholders, the greater the 
number of institutions that were dismantled during the decentralization process; and the 
longer the decentralization process took 
•  The greater the presence of existing user groups in the basin, the greater the reported 
improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization 
•  The greater the share of the RBO budget spent within/returned to the basin, the greater the 
extent of reported improvement between “before” and “after” decentralization; the more 
likely that some form of institutional change was associated with the decentralization 
process; and the greater the extent of reported success with respect to the major objectives 
of basin management 
•  The greater the RBO budget per capita, the lower the extent of reported success with respect 
to the major objectives of basin management. 
  The overall results of this group of variables indicate the importance of the presence of 
water user organizations in making the difference between pre and past decentralization reforms.   40
Involvement of such groups, as other participatory processes, may make the process longer, but as 
we already indicated, longer doesn’t necessarily mean worse.  The results also provide additional 
support to the old ‘mantra’ that budget that goes back to the source has a greater impact on   
stakeholder involvement and system performance—in this case the decentralization reform.  One 
interesting result is that richer basins—this time measured in budget per capita—are not necessarily 
more successful.  As with our earlier findings about natural resource endowments, success in river 
basin management is not necessarily confined to well-endowed basins.  Our take from these results is 
that the RBO budget is an important tool for management, enhancement of participation and if well designed and 
managed, could promote the decentralization process. 
  With this summary and lessons, we can move now to discuss the overall conclusions and 
policy implications that one can draw from the analysis.  
7. Conclusion, Policy Implications and Extension of the Analysis 
The results of our econometric estimates suggest that both the decentralization process and the 
performance level of the decentralization are well explained by a set of explanatory variables.   
Several independent variables provide a robust explanation regardless of the equation selected and 
the estimation procedure used.  We would like to especially address several of these variables, which 
worked well throughout the various sets of estimates.   
Water scarcity is an important variable that affects the process as well as the performance of 
decentralization.  When water in the basin is less abundant, incentives for a simpler decentralization 
process and a more successful outcome are more likely.  Scarcity was positively associated with 
several aspects of the decentralization process and with the decentralization performance (remember 
that the more negative the scarcity coefficient the more scarce water is).  The presence of scarcity 
may therefore be a stimulus to reform, uniting the stakeholders in the basin. 
In addition to water scarcity, the number and severity of other water resource problems 
present in a basin prior to decentralization was (perhaps surprisingly) a positive factor with respect 
to both the initiation of decentralization reforms and their perceived success.  The more ambitious 
and nearly comprehensive the decentralization effort was, and the greater the problems users faced, 
the more likely they were to see the effort as worthwhile and effective. 
Existence and number of existing organized user groups was positively associated with the 
initiation of decentralization reforms, but also with the costs and difficulty of achieving  41
decentralization.  Existence of dispute resolution mechanisms was positively associated with water 
user involvement and with perceived decentralization performance.  Length of the decentralization 
process was positively associated with perceptions of decentralization success and with tariff 
compliance and share of the RBO budget contributed by stakeholders.  A decentralization process 
that was characterized by protracted political struggle leaves a negative impact on the 
decentralization performance. 
Dismantling of institutions during the decentralization process contributes to the 
performance of the decentralization process.  Combined with the two preceding findings, it appears 
that complexity and conflict are two distinct characteristics and work in opposite ways.  The mere 
presence of a larger number of organizations within a river basin, and the sheer length of time a 
decentralization reform takes do not appear to be substantial negative factors.  On the other hand, 
highly conflictive decentralization processes are associated with poorer performance, and some 
elimination of previously existing institutional arrangements may be a positive factor.  Thus what 
matters is not so much how complicated or lengthy the process is, but the degree of conflict and the 
ability to make organizational changes along the way. 
River basins with higher percentages of their budgets from external governmental sources 
(such as the local and federal governments) benefit from better stability and support and it shows in 
the performance of the decentralization process, although the same relationship does not hold for 
the budget share contributed by other outside sources. 
  In basins where stakeholders accepted greater financial responsibility, complying with tariffs 
and contributing to the budget for basin management, decentralization process and performance 
measures increased.
11  Combined with the preceding finding, it appears that the financial dimensions 
of decentralized river basin management are both important and complex: success is associated with 
central government support as well as water user financial responsibility and with revenues generated 
within the basin remaining in the basin.  Thus it is the combination of financial responsibility (on the 
part of water users), financial autonomy (basin revenues remaining in the basin), and central 
government support that is associated with success, and not necessarily one element alone.  This is 
consistent with our analytical framework, which hypothesized that a configuration of factors that 
                                                 
11 A reviewer correctly indicated that compliance is good also in cases where centralized management is in place.  It was 
suggested that compliance with tariff payment is a critical measure of the reform success that deserves to be treated as a 
dependent variable also.  Our future work will address this proposed analysis.  42
included a supportive but not controlling role for the central government, and responsibility but not 
complete independence for the water users in the basin, would be associated with successful 
implementation of decentralization reforms. 
Although we addressed a comprehensive list of relationships in the quest to understand the 
process and level of success of river basin decentralization, we still feel that many questions can be 
answered using the data we collected.  We mainly are interested in answering questions about the 
interactions among variables and the shape of the estimated relationship function.  In this report we 
use only linear relationships and do not consider interaction terms; we would need to extend the 
work to address such issues as well. 
The results reported in this working paper are preliminary in that they assume simplistic 
relationships between the process and performance variables and the explanatory variables.  For 
example, the transmission links between the four sets of variables and the process and performance 
variables are unidirectional, but indeed, they are linked as a system and should be analyzed using a 
more complicated analytical framework such that the single equation or at most the dual equation 
system we used.    
Another aspect that might be of great importance is the possibility of estimating various 
reform packaging and sequencing options and their impact on the process and performance of the 
decentralization.  Given initial conditions in the basins, this analysis may yield some 
recommendations of tailor made packaging and sequencing, with special attention to be given to the 
mix of certain issues such as balanced functional specialization between local to federal agencies, 
user participation policy, and property rights format, or others that have been identified in the 
analysis.  43
References  
Alaerts, G.J. 1999. “Institutions for River Basin Management. The Role of External Support 
Agencies (International Donors) in Developing Cooperative Arrangements”, International 
Workshop on River Basin Management – Best Management Practices, Delft University of 
Technology/River Basin Administration (RBA), The Hague, October 27-29, 1999.  
Allee, David J. 1988. River Basin Management”, Proceedings of an Engineering Foundation 
Conference: the Role of Social and Behavioral Sciences in Water Resources Planning and 
Management”, New York: NY.   
Azevedo, G. and M. Asad. 2000. “The Political Process behind the Implementation of Bulk Water 
Pricing in Brazil”, p 317. Dinar, A. (ed.) The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Bennett (Lewis), L., 2000, “The Integration of Water Quality into Transboundary Allocation 
Agreements: Lessons from the Southwestern United States,” Agricultural Economics, 24, 113-
125. 
Bennett (Lewis), L., Ragland, S. and P. Yolles. 1998. “Facilitating International Agreements Through 
and Interconnected Game Approach:  The Case of River Basins,” in Conflict and Cooperation 
on Trans-Boundary Water Resources (Just and Netanyahu, Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston, 61-85. 
Blomquist, W. 1988. “Getting Out of the Commons Trap: Variables, Process, and Results in Four 
Groundwater Basins,” Social Science Perspectives Journal. Vol. 2, Number 4, pp. 16-44. 
Blomquist, W. 1992. Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California. San 
Francisco, CA: ICS Press 
Blomquist, W. 1994. “Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in 
Southern California,” In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Elinor Ostrom, Roy 
Gardner, and James Walker, eds. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 283-300 
Blomquist, W. and E. Schlager. 1999. Watershed Management from the Ground Up: Political Science and the 
Explanation of Regional Governance Arrangements. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1999. 54 pp. 
Borge, L., 1996, “The Behavior of Bureaucrats and the Choice between Single-Purpose and Multi-
purpose Authorities,” Public Finance Quarterly. Vol. 24 (2). p 173-91. April. 
Bromley, D.W. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions. New York: Basil Blackwell.  
Casella, A. and B. Frey. 1992. “Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of Overlapping 
Political Jurisdictions,” European Economic Review, Vol. 36 (2-3). p 639-46. April. 
Cerniglia, Floriana. 2003.  “Decentralization in the Public Sector: Quantitative Aspects in Federal 
and Unitary Countries.  Journal of Policy Modeling, 25: 749-776. 
Dinar, Shlomi and Ariel Dinar. 2005.  “SCARPERATION: The Role of Scarcity in Cooperation 
among Basin Riparians”, Paper presented at the 2005 International Study Association 
Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5. 
El-Awad, O.M. and Ahmed, S.E. 1999. “Economic Reforms of Sudan Irrigation Sub-sector and 
Impact on Water Use,” Comprehensive water resources development of the Nile Basin: the vision for the  44
next century. Proceedings of the Seventh Nile 2002 Conference, Cairo, Egypt, 15-19 March, 
1999.  
Folmer, H., P. van Mouche and S. Ragland, “Interconnected Games and International 
Environmental Problems,” Resource and Environmental Economics, 3: 313-335. 
Gustafsson, J.E. 1989. Vattenfoervaltning i Frankrike. Rapport R21:1989. Stockholm: 
Byggforskningsraadet.  
Global Water Partnership (GWP), 2000. “Integrated Water Resources Management” Background 
Paper No. 4, Stockholm: GWP. 
Global Water Partnership (GWP), 2004. “Informal Stakeholder Baseline Survey: Current Status of 
National Efforts to Move Towards Sustainable Water Management Using an IWRM 
Approach”  Status Report No. 1, April.  Stockholm: GWP. 
Hinchcliffe, Fiona, John Thompson, and Jules Pretty, eds. 1998. Fertile Ground: The Impacts of 
Participatory Watershed Management. Stylus Publishers. 
Holling, C.S. 1978. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons 
ICWE 1992. The Dublin Statement and Report of the Conference. International Conference on Water and 
the Environment, 26-31 January 1992.  
Kemper, K. E. and D. Olson 2000. “Water Pricing: The Dynamics of Institutional Change in 
Mexico and Ceará, Brazil,” p. 335, Dinar, A. (ed.) Water Pricing: The  dynamics of institutional 
change in Mexico and Ceara, Brazil, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Kemper, K.E. 1996. The Cost of Free Water. Water Resources Allocation and Use in the Curu Valley, Ceará, 
Northeast Brazil. Ph.D. Dissertation, Linkoping University, Department of Water and 
Environmental Studies: Linkoping, Sweden.  
Libecap, G.D. 1994. “The Conditions for Successful Collective Action,” Journal of Theoretical Politics. 
Volume 6, Number 4, pp. 563-592 
Maddala, G.S. 1989. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Econometric Society 
Monographs No.3. Cambridge University Press.  
McGinnis, Michael D., ed. 1999. Polycentric Governance and Development. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press 
McGinnis, Michael D., ed. 1999. Polycentric Governance and Local Public Economies. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press 
McGinnis, Michael D., ed. 2000. Polycentric Games and Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and A. Subramanian 1996. Incentives for Water Users’ Associations: Evidence from 
Experience. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID): New Delhi, India.  
Mody, J. 2001. Literature Review: Management of River Basin Systems Through Decentralization. Unpublished. 
Report prepared for the World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Musgrave, Warren, 1997.  Decentralized Mechanisms and Institutions for Managing Water 
Resources: Reflections on Experience from Australia.  In: Parker Douglas and Yacov Tsur,  45
(Eds.) Decentralization and Coordination of Water Resource Management.  KLuwer 
Academic Publishers pp. 429-447. 
Naiman, Robert I., ed. 1994. Watershed Management: Balancing Sustainability and Environmental 
Change. Berlin: Springer Verlag 
Newson, Malcolm D. 1997. Land, Water and Development: Sustainable Management of River Basin 
Systems. Second Edition. London, UK: Routledge 
Niranjan, P. 1999. “Impact of irrigation management transfer in Maharashtra. An assessment,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 34 (13): p.A-17-A-26.  
Oechssler, J. 1997. “Decentralization and the Coordination Problem,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 32, 119-135. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press 
Ostrom, E. 1992. Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press 
Pradhan, P. and D.J. Bandaragoda 1997. Legal and Institutional Environment of Water Users’ Association for 
Sustainable Irrigation Management. Asian Productivity Organization: Tokyo, Japan. 
Ragin, Charles. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 
Ragland, S.E. 1995. International Environmental Externalities and Interconnected Games. Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Colorado, Boulder. 
Salman, S.M.A. 1997. The Legal Framework for Water Users’ Associations: A Comparative Study. World 
Bank Technical Paper No. 360. World Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Samad, Madar, 2005. Water institutional reforms in Sri Lanka. Water Policy, xxxxxxxxxx 
Shubik, M. 1984. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Political Economy, Vol. 2 of Game Theory in the Social 
Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Simon, Benjamin, 2002.  Devolution of Bureau of Reclamation Constructed Facilities.  Journal of 
the American Water Resources Association, 38(5):1187-1194. 
Straffin, P.D. 1993. Game Theory and Strategy. The Mathematical Association of America. 
Vermillion, D.L. and C. Garces-Restrepo, C. 1998. Impacts of Colombia’s Current Irrigation Management 
Transfer Program. Research Report – International Irrigation Management Institute. Colombo, 
Sri Lanka. 
Walther, P. 1987. “Against Idealistic Beliefs in the Problem-Solving Capacities of Integrated 
Resource Management.” Environmental Management. Volume 11, Number 4 (July/Aug.), pp. 
439-446 
World Bank 1993. Water Resources Management: A World Bank Policy Paper. Washington, DC.  
World Bank 1999. Mexico – Policy Options for Aquifer Stabilization. Volume I. Policy Report. Mexico 
Country Management Unit (unpublished).  46
Annex 1: Administering the River Basin Survey (Report prepared by INBO)
12 
About 200 questionnaires were sent by e-mail, fax or surface mail to RBOs, national administrations 
in charge of water, and international commissions.
13  
Some answers were clear: 
•  positive in some cases, as some administrations forwarded the questionnaire to the relevant 
bodies,  
•  or negative from the international commissions, those usually being a small coordination unit 
not able to answer the questions that were actually relevant to the different countries concerned, 
as members of the International Commission. In the case of the Danube River for instance, 13 
countries are involved and compiling data from all these countries is a difficult task.  
  The only positive answers from International Commissions came from the Zambezi River 
Basin Authority and the Niger Basin Authority. 
14 
  As far as the national administrations are concerned, if we except some countries like 
Burkina Faso, the Czech Republic and Romania for instance, the answers were mainly negative 
(Ivory Coast, South Africa, Bulgaria, etc.) as the creation of RBOs was planned but not effective at 
that time. 
Difficulties encountered 
The first difficulty is that people usually are not keen about answering any kind of questionnaire or 
do not give it first priority. Therefore several reminders (three) were necessary to have any kind of 
reply. 
  Another difficulty encountered is that there are several kinds of RBOs with different 
responsibilities, therefore one single questionnaire could not cover them all, or some questions were 
outside RBOs responsibilities. 
There are:  
RBOs that have existed for a long time 
                                                 
12 RBOs with no entries in the table were either not approached nor been followed. 
13 INBO Members have commented about this questionnaire and found it non adapted to practical RBOs in the field 
and, therefore, faced numerous difficulties in answering it. 
14 Questionnaires from RBOs of transboundary rivers were eliminated from the sample.  47
This is the case of the French Water Agencies, created by the 1964 law, and the Spanish 
Hydrological Confederations that have been created since 1926 (year of the creation of the 
Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro, the first one to be created). Therefore the differentiation 
between what happened before and after the creation of the RBO was not relevant, one can hope 
that some progress has been achieved but quantifying it is a cumbersome, if not impossible exercise. 
RBOs newly created 
This is specially the case in the Eastern European countries (Poland, Romania), in some Latin-
American (Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, etc.) and North African countries (Algeria, 
Morocco), for which answering to all questions were sometimes difficult, although they made 
tremendous efforts to do so. 
  Regional Water, Environmental or land planning Authorities. They are of two kinds: 
either they have existed for some time and have also some RBOs responsibilities, this is the case of 
the Czech Republic (1966), Italy (1989-1990) and the Philippines (LLDA - 1966),  
or are being planned to become RBOs in the long term (Mexico).  
  It is also the case in Poland and Romania where the regional water authorities are also 
RBOs, in their case   answering all the questions may be easier if all data are available. 
Basin Committees 
These committees may be an advisory body complementary to the RBO itself (France) or a body 
gathering volunteers from water professionals, the civil society and users, whose task is advising in 
any matter related to the river basin, this is the case in Quebec and for most of the Brazilian Basin 
Committees, some of those are almost RBOs or will become one in the future.  
  Another difficulty is that very few RBOs cover all aspects of water management: 
Water supply and sanitation are usually under the responsibility of other administrations, 
municipalities, local governments or private companies and, therefore, the RBOs may not have the 
data regarding these aspects, the same occurs for electricity, 
water infrastructures may be managed directly by the RBOs (dams, dikes, etc.), this is the case of the 
Spanish Confederations and Polish RZGWs for instance, or by other administrations or large private 
or state-governed developing companies (France).  48
  Clearly, the main difficulty encountered are the data themselves (available or not).  This lead 
to several kinds of situation: 
The data do exist but are dispersed or too plentiful: this is typically the case of the large river basins, 
international or national ones. As regards the large transboundary basins (for example the Danube, 
the Rhine, etc.), the data exist at the level of the countries.  
  RBOs may also cover very large national river basins, or several river basins, and in that case 
the data may be available in a database, or several databases: this means making choices between 
data widely different in each point of the basin or basins.  
  An example can be given: it concerns the water quality parameters. The same parameters 
may be used in the whole basin, with perhaps some additional ones in very specific sampling points, 
but the results may be very different from a measurement station to another. This will depend of the 
station location. In the case of the Rhone basin for instance, a station located in Lyons (a very large 
town with an industrial complex on the main watercourse) will provide results very different (as 
pollution is high) from a station located on a tributary in the mountains (although some nitrates may 
be found in agricultural areas). Therefore, giving some exact figures characterizing the whole basin is 
impossible, even if all these data do exist.  
The river basin is small but the data do not exist or are not gathered in a database. Giving figures 
(exact or estimated), if at all, may be difficult in that case. This might be better in the future, as river 
basin databases are now created when the RBOs are being set up (although this is not true 
everywhere). 
Outcome 
In spite of these difficulties, many countries have responded.  The following is a tally of the 
responses by regions: 
Africa 
The RBOs are not yet widely developed in Africa. If we except some international commissions 
(Chad, Niger, Senegal, the Nile, Zambezi, etc.), there are few RBOs at the national level, so the 
answers were limited: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Morocco. 
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Asia - Pacific 
There are few RBOs in Asia, or even Basin Development Authorities (Philippines). The existing or 
newly created RBOs did respond: Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Uzbekistan. 
Latin America 
The RBOs are widely developing in the Latin American Countries. Some already do exist in different 
forms, such as (a) RBO as such, (b) a regional authority with RBO responsibilities, (c) a consortium, 
or (d) a Basin Committee. 
  However, the answers were few if compared with the total number of organizations (116), 
69 from Brazil alone (Basin Committees and consortiums). The answers came from Brazil (9), 
Colombia (5), Ecuador (2), Guatemala (1), Mexico (13), Peru (1) and Venezuela (1). 
North America 
If there are some kinds of RBO in the United States: Basin Committees or Basin Development 
Authorities, the Basin Committees are new in Canada, in the Quebec Province. So there were few 
answers, 2 from each country, the USA being directly contacted by the World Bank. 
Europe 
Some RBOs have existed for a long time (Spain, France) or are relatively new (Poland, Romania). 
  In the Eastern European Countries, candidates to accession to the European Union, 
management of water resources at the level of basin districts will become compulsory to comply 
with the European Water Framework Directive of 2000, therefore the creation of RBOs is either 
under way or planned in some countries (Bulgaria, Slovenia, etc.). 
  The Czech Republic, Poland and Romania fully responded, France, Italy and Spain less so. 
There were 29 replies in total. 
 
Signed by Joël MANCEL 
INBO Deputy Technical Secretary 
Prepared by Gisèle SINE 
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Tally of the Basins that were approached by INBO 
Basin Name  Reply to 1st 
request 
Reply to 2nd 
request 
Reply to 3rd 
request 
Had to be 
revisited 
ALGEROIS - HODNA - SOUMMAN (AHS) 
Algeria 
1    1 
CHELIFF ZAHREZ (ABH-CZ) - Algeria    1    1 
CONSTANTINOIS - SEYBOUSSE – MELLEGUE - Algeria    1     
ORANIE-CHOTT CHERGUI - Algeria         
EWASO NGIRO NORTH DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY - Kenya         
EWASO NGIRO SOUTH DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY - Kenya         
TANA AND ATHI RIVERS (TARDA) - Kenya    1     
COAST DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY - Kenya         
C O M O E  –  B u r k i n a  F a s o          
VOLTA  (Nakanbé) – Burkina Faso  1       
KAGERA  -  Rwanda      
OUM ER RBIA - Morocco      1   
SEBOU - Morocco      1   
LOUKKOS - Morocco      1  1 
NIGER   1   1 
ORANGE RIVER – South Africa         
ZAMBEZI RIVER - Zambia  1       
MATANZA-RIACHUELO  6  Argentina      
RIO  BERMEJO  -  Argentina      
SALTO GRANDE - Argentina         
SOROCABA E MEDIO TIETE (CBH-SMT) - Brazil  1      1 
PIRACICABA E CAPIVARI - Brazil  1       
CBH-MOSQUITO - Brazil  1      1 
RIO ITAJAI - Brazil         
ALTO TIETE (CBH-AT) - Brazil         
PEIXE PARANAPANEMA (CHB-PP) - Brazil         
AGUAPEI/PEIXE (CBH-AP) - Brazil         
BAIXO TIETE (CBH-BT) - Brazil         
SAO JOSE DOS DOURADOS (CBH-SJD) - Brazil         
TURVO/GRANDE (CBH-TG) - Brazil         
ALTO PARANAPANEMA (CBH-ALPA) - Brazil         
LITORAL NORTE (CBH-LN) - Brazil         
BAIXADA SANTISTA (CBH-BS) - Brazil         
IGUAPE E LITORAL SUL (CBH-RB) - Brazil         
PARDO (CBH-PARDO) - Brazil  1      1 
SAPUCAI-MIRIM/GRANDE (CBH-SMG) - Brazil         
TIETE/JACARE (CBH-TJ) - Brazil         
BAIXO PARDO/GRANDE (CBH-BPG) - Brazil      1  1 
RIO PARA (CBH-PARA) - Brazil         
VALE DO JIQUIRICA - Brazil         
RIO TAQUARI (COINTA) - Brazil         
RIOS APA E MIRANDA (CIDEMA) - Brazil         
RIO SAO FRANCISCO (CEIVASF) - Brazil         
RIO GRANDE DO SUL (CHR-RS) - Brazil         
PARAIBA DO SUL E MANTIQUEIRA (CBH-PSM) - Brazil         
RIO PARANAIBA (EM FERMACAO) - Brazil         
RIO MOGI GUACU (CBH-MOGI) - Brazil         
Rios Cachoeira e Almada - Brazil         
RIO MURIAE E POMBA - Brazil         
PARAIBA DO SUL (CEIVAP) - Brazil         
RIO PIRAPAMA - Brazil         
R I O  I P O J U C A  -  B r a z i l          
RIO  PARACATU  -  Brazil      
RIO PARAOPEBA (CIBAPAR) - Brazil      1  1 
RIO  ARAGUARI  -  Brazil      
RIO  ARAGUARI  -  Brazil      
RIO VERDE - Brazil         
RIO  CARATINGA  -  Brazil      
RIO  JACARAIPE  -  Brazil      
RIO SERGIPE - Brazil         
RIO  GUANDU  -  Brazil      
PONTAL DO PARANAPANEMA - Brazil          51
SERRA DA MANTIQUEIRA - Brazil         
LITORAL NORTE - Brazil         
ALTO IGUACU/RIBEIRA - Brazil         
RIO JORDAO - Brazil         
R I O  D O  P E I X E  -  B r a z i l          
R I O   C A M B O R I U   -   B r a z i l       
RIO DO TIJUCAS - Brazil         
RIO  CUBATAO  -  Brazil      
RIO  ITAPOCU  -  Brazil      
RIO TUBARAO E COMPLEXO LAGUNAR - Brazil      1  1 
RIOS TURVO – SANTA ROSA – SANTO CRISTO - Brazil         
RIO APUAE-INHANDAVA - Brazil         
Rio Ibicuí - Brazil         
SANTA MARIA - Brazil      1  1 
RIOS TAQUARI E ANTAS - Brazil         
RIO ALTO JACUI - Brazil      1   
RIOS VACACAI E VACACAI MIRIM - Brazil         
RIO BAIXO JACUI - Brazil         
RIO  CAI  -  Brazil      
RIO GRAVATAI - Brazil         
LAGO  GUAIBA  -  Brazil      
RIO TRAMANDAI - Brazil         
RIO  CAMAMAQUA  -  Brazil      
RIO IJUI - Brazil         
BIO  BIO  -  Chile      
CUNDINAMARCA (CAR) – Colombia – 5 basins  1 (5)      1 
C A U C A   -   C o l o m b i a       
RIONEGRO-NARE (CORNARE) - Colombia         
RIOS NIMA Y AMAINE - Colombia         
RIOS BOGOTA, UBATE Y SUAREZ - Colombia         
CORANTOQUIA  -  Colombia      
ASOCARS  -  Colombia      
Norte y Oriente Amazónico (CDA) - Colombia         
ALTO MAGDALENA (CAM) - Colombia         
CHOCO (CODECHOCO) - Colombia         
Meseta de Bucaramanga (CDMB) - Colombia         
MACARENA  -  Colombia      
MAGDALENA  (CORPAMAG)  -  Colombia      
CALDAS (CORPOCALDAS) - Colombia         
FRONTERA NORORIENTE (CORPONOR) - Colombia         
URABÁ (CORPOURABA) - Colombia         
QUINDÍO  (CRQ)  -  Colombia      
Guavio (CORPOGUAVIO) - Colombia         
ORINOQUIA (CORPORINOQUIA) - Colombia         
RISARALDA  (CARDER)  -  Colombia      
S A N  J U A N  –  C o s t a  R i c a          
RIO GRANDE DE TARCOLES (CRGT) – Costa Rica         
RIO TEMPISQUE (ASOTEM) – Costa Rica         
RIO MACHANGARA - Ecuador  1       
Rio Cutuchi - Ecuador  1       
RIO PAUTE - Ecuador         
LAGO DE AMATITLAN (AMSA) - Guatemala  1      1 
BAJA CALIFORNIA - Mexico      1   
RIO BALSAS - Mexico      1   
RIO BRAVO - Mexico      1   
CUENCAS CENTRALES - Mexico      1   
FRONTERA SUR - Mexico      1   
GOLFO CENTRO – Mexico      1   
GOLFO NORTE - Mexico      1   
LERMA SANTIAGO - Mexico      1   
NOROESTE - Mexico      1   
PACIFICO NORTE - Mexico      1   
PACIFICO SUR - Mexico      1   
PENINSULA YUCATAN - Mexico      1   
VALE DE MEXICO - Mexico      1   
RIO PILCOMAYO - Paraguay         
CHIRA-PIURA - Peru  1       
JEQUETEPEQUE  -  Peru       52
LAGO DE MARACAIBO (ICLAM) - Venezuela         
R Í O   T U Y   -   V e n e z u e l a       
Lago de Valencia - Venezuela         
ESCOUMINS – Quebec - Canada      1   
YAMASKA – Quebec - Canada      1   
Fraser bRITISH cOLUMBIA cANADA  1       
JASA TIRTA - Indonesia  1       
LAGUNA LAKE (LLDA) - Philippines      1  1 
RED RIVER - Vietnam      1  1 
CENTRAL ASIA (SIC ICWC)- Uzbekistan  1      1 
MURRAY-DARLING  -  Australia      
POVODI LABE – Czech Republic    1     
POVODI ODRY– Czech Republic      1   
POVODI OHRE – Czech Republic      1   
POVODI VITAVY – Czech Republic         
POVODI MORAVY – Czech Republic      1   
Ile de la Réunion - France  1      1 
RHIN-MEUSE - France  1      1 
GUADELOUPE  -  France      
GUYANE  -  France      
ARTOIS-PICARDIE  -  France      
MARTINIQUE  -  France      
LOIRE-BRETAGNE  -  France      
RHONE-MEDITERRANEE-CORSE - France  1       
ADOUR-GARONNE - France      1   
SEINE-NORMANDIE  -  France      
ADIGE  -  Italy      
ARNO  -  Italy      
Basilicata  -  Italy      
Liri, Garigliano e Volturno - Italy         
T e v e r e   -   I t a l y       
R E N O   -   I t a l y       
Sarno - Italy      1   
PO - Italy    1     
SERCHIO  -  Italy      
MAGRA  -  Italy      
Alto Adriatico - Italy      1   
GLIWICE  -  Poland      
WROCLAW  -  Poland      
POZNAN - Poland  1       
WARSZAWA - Poland  1      1 
GDANSK - Poland  1      1 
KRAKOW - Poland    1     
SZCZECIN - Poland    1    1 
Ialomita-Buzau - Romania  1       
Somes Tisza - Romania    1    1 
Mures River - Romania      1   
Olt River - Romania      1   
Siret - Romania  1      1 
Danube & Seashore - Romania      1   
Banat - Romania      1   
GUADALQUIVIR - Spain  1      1 
JUCAR - Spain  1      1 
GUADIANA - Spain      1  1 
T A J O   -   S p a i n       
SUR - Spain      1  1 
SEGURA  -  Spain      
EBRO - Spain    1    1 
N O R T E   -   S p a i n       
D U E R O   -   S p a i n        53
Annex 2: Structure of variables in Dataset  
Legend: 
string     data exists as a string (abcde) in database 
int    data exists as an integer in database  
float       data exists in double precision float (0.00) format in database 
scale      response is expected to fit into a predetermined scale (0-6 = x, 6-12 = y, etc) 
percentage   response is expected in percentages (i.e. 0.79 = 79%) 
number   to be interpreted as a number (1,2,3,4, etc) indicating quantity 
m
3         response to be interpreted in cubic meters of volume 
km
2       response to be interpreted in square kilometers of area 
variables are arranged chronologically by question number. (e.g Variable #1 = Question #1, 
Variable #11 = Question #2 ,….. Variable #223 = Question #47 ) 
 
General Data 
Variable #1| Question #1| basinname | name of basin | string 
Variable #2| Question #1|country | name of country | string 
Variable #3| Question #1| rboname | name of river basin organization | string 
Variable #4| Question #1| address | river basin organizations’ address | string 
Variable #5| Question #1| contactperson | contact person | string  
Variable #6| Question #1| position | organizational position of contact person | string 
Variable #7| Question #1| telephone | contact telephone information | int 
Variable #8| Question #1| fax | contact fax information | int 
Variable #9| Question #1| email  | contact email information & website for river basin 
organization | string 
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Institutional Setup 
Variable #10 | Question #1| basinarea | area of river basin in square km | float 
Variable #11 | Question #2 | populationtotal | total population in river basin | int 
Variable #12 | Question #2 | populationrural | rural population as percentage of total | float 
Variable #13 | Question #3 | precipitation | river basin precipitation in millimeters | float 
Variable #14 | Question #4 | evapotransp | river basin evapotranspiration in millimeters | float 
Variable #15 | Question #5 | waterresources | river basin water resources in million cubic meters 
per year | float 
Variable #16 | Question #6 | countriesshare | number of countries sharing river basin | int 
Variable #17 | Question #7 | iyeadecentr | period over which decentralization occurred in   years 
| float 
Variable #18 | Question #8 | iyearrbo | year of creation of river basin | int 
Variable #19 | Question #9 | iobjectwaterconflict | water conflict as RBO objective | int 
Variable #20 | Question #9 | iobjectflood | flood control as RBO objective | int 
Variable #21 | Question #9 | iobjectwaterscarcity | water scarcity as RBO objective | int 
Variable #22,23,24 | Question #9 | iobjectothers | iobjectothers2 | iobjectothers3 | other 
RBO objectives | 0= n/a,1 = pollution,2 = water resources management,3 = water quality,4 = 
hydropower,5 = planning,6 = stabilization of aquifer,7 = conservation,8 = iwrm,9 = development 
schemes,10 = public awareness,11 = resource evaluation,12 = maintenance,13 = water management 
education,14 = hydrological work,15 = sanitation,16 = watershed conservation,17 = improve 
efficiency,18 = navigation,19 = flood control,20 = water scarcity,21 = water conflicts,22 = water 
utilization,23 =   recreation,24 = dam safety,25 = river administration | int  
Variable #25,26,27,28,29,30 | Question #10 | ifloodscale | iwaterscarcscale | 
iwaterconflictscale | iothers1scale | iothers2scale | measurement of success against objectives | 
scale | int    55
Variable #31 | Question #11 | ibody | governing body of the river basin |0 = “N/A”,1 = 
“Federal”,2 = “State Authority”’3 = “State owned company”,4 = “Regional Authority”,5 = 
“Regional Board/Council/Committe” | int 
Variable #32 | Question #13 | ilaws | laws and decrees governing RBO | string 
Variable #33,34 | Question #14 | icreationrbo | icreationrboupdown  | method of RBO 
creation (bottom/up or Top/Bottom), 0 = “N/A”,1 = “Bottom-up”,2 = “Top-Down”| any 
explanations offered | int | string 
Variable #35 | Question #15 | iinstdismantled | institutions dismantled in decentralization 
process | string    
  Variable #36 | Question #16 | inewinstitution | new institutions that had to be created in 
decentralization process | string 
Variable #37 | Question #17 | icostdecentinstitutions | cost of the decentralization process via 
the creation of new institutions | 0 = none, 1=Low, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=high | int 
Variable #38, 39, 40 | Question #17 | icostdecent17othername1 | icostdecent17othername2 | 
icostdecent17othername3 | cost of the decentralization process via other processes | 0 = n/a,1 = 
resource allocation, 2 = profit sharing, 3 = Operating costs, 4 = new laws, 5 = activities 
coordination | string 
Variable #41, 42, 43 | Question #17 | icostdecent17other1 |  icostdecent17other2 |   
icostdecent17other3 | scale of decentralization process cost | scale | 0 = none, 1=Low, 5=high | 
int 
Variable #44 | Question #18 | iforums | forums available to hear disputes | string 
Variable #45 | Question #18 | iforumsyesno | Do forums exist for hearing disputes |  0 = 
n/a,1= yes,2 = no | int 
Variable #46 | Question #19 | iissuesresolved | main types of disputes/issues that usually need 
resolving | string 
Variable #47 | Question #20 | iwaterassociations  |  degree  of involvement of water user 
associations | percentage | float   56
Variable #48 | Question #20 | iwaterassociationsyesno | have water user associations been 
established | 0 = n/a,1 = yes,2 = no | int 
Variable #49 | Question #20 | iwaterassociationshowmany | how many water user associations 
have been established | int 
Variable #50 | Question #21| itypesinfrustcanal | quantity of canals in the basin (number if 
<=20)  | number and km | int    
Variable #51 | Question #21| itypesinfrustreservoir | quantity of reservoirs in the basin (number 
if <=300)  | number and m
3 | int    
Variable #52 | Question #21| itypesinfrustdam | quantity of dams in the basin | number | int  
Variable #53 | Question #21| itypesinfrustwatertreat | quantity of water treatment facilities in 
the basin | number | int    
Variable #54,55| Question #21| itypesinfrust21othername1 | itypesinfrust21othername2 | 
other types of infrastructure in the basin | 0 = n/a,1 = dewatering stations,2 = protection of 
banks,3 = pump stations,4 = waste water treatment,5 = sluices,6 = tunnels,7 = piped schemes,8 = 
hydropower,9 = wells,10 = navigation,11 = control structures,12 = water tanks,13 = drainage 
network | (number if <=300 except for 11 & 4)  | number and km | int    
Variable #56,57 | Question #21| itypesinfrust21other1 | itypesinfrust21other2 | quantity of 
other types of infrastructures in the basin | number | int  
Variable #58 | Question #22 | iwateruse1 | irrigation users in the basin | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #59 | Question #22 | iwateruse2 | industrial users in the basin |  
Variable #60 | Question #22 | iwateruse3 | domestic users in the basin | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #61 | Question #22 | iwateruse4 | hydropower usage in the basin | 0 = no,1 = yes | int  
Variable #62 | Question #22 | iwateruse5 | environmental uses/applications in the basin | 0 = 
no,1 = yes | int  
Variable #63, 64, 65, | Question #22 | iwateruse22other1 |  iwateruse22other2 | 
iwateruse22other3 | other user types in the basin | O = n/a,1 = wetlands,2 = animal husbandry,3 
= navigation,4 = livestock,5 = fisheries,6 = pisciculture,7 = transportation,8 = thermal power 
plants,9 = minning,10 = recreation,11 = zootechny | int  57
Variable #66 | Question #22 | ishare1 | share of irrigation use in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #67 | Question #2 | ishare2 | share of industrial use in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #68 | Question #22 | ishare3 | share of domestic use in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #69 | Question #22 | ishare4 | share of hydropower use in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #70 | Question #22 | ishare5 | share of environmental use in the basin | percentage | 
float   
Variable #71, 72, 73 | Question #22 | ishare22other1 | ishare22other2 | ishare22other3 | share 
of other uses in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #74 | Question #24 | waterusegw  | share of ground water (only) in the basin | 
percentage | float 
Variable #75 | Question #24 | waterusesw  | share of surface water (only) in the basin | 
percentage | float 
Variable #76 | Question #24 | wateruseboth | share of both ground water and surface water in 
the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #77,78,79 | Question #24 | wateruse24othername1 | wateruse24othername2 | 
wateruse24othername3 | other types of water | 0 = n/a,1 = rainwater harvesting,2= mine water | 
int 
Variable #80,81,82 | Question #24 | wateruse24other1 | wateruse24other2 | wateruse24other3 
| share of other water types in the basin | percentage | float 
Variable #83 | Question #25 | indprobbfloods | level of flooding problems before establishment 
of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe problem | int 
Variable #84 | Question #25 | indprobbwaterscarcity | level of water scarcity problems before 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe problem | 
int 
Variable #85 | Question #25 | indprobbenvquality | level of environmental quality problems 
before establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe 
problem | int  58
Variable #86 | Question #25 | indprobbwaterconflicts | level of water conflict problems before 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe problem | 
int 
Variable #87 | Question #25 | indprobblanddegrad | level of land degradation problems before 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe problem | 
int 
Variable #88 | Question #25 | indprobbdevelpissues | level of problems with development 
issues before establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = 
severe problem | int 
Variable #89 | Question #25 | othername | Other problems (before and after) the establishment 
of RBO | 0 = n/a,1 = water mgt issues and authority crises,2 = Env. Awareness,3 = Organization,4 
= Hydropower,5 = Water Supply,6 = Drought | int 
Variable #90 | Question #25 | indprobbother25 | level of other problems before establishment of 
RBO | 1 = no response,2 = no problem,3 = some problem,4 = severe problem | int 
Variable #91 | Question #25 | indprobafloods | level of flooding problems after establishment of 
RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = situation worsened | int 
Variable #92 | Question #25 | indprobawaterscarcity | | level of water scarcity  problems after 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = situation 
worsened | int 
Variable #93 | Question #25 | indprobaenvquality | | level of environmental quality problems 
after establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = 
situation worsened | int 
Variable #94 | Question #25 | indprobawaterconflicts | level of water conflict problems after 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = situation 
worsened | int 
Variable #95 | Question #25 | indprobalanddegrad | level of land degradation problems after 
establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = situation 
worsened | int  59
Variable #96 | Question #25 | indprobadevelpissues | | level of problems with development 
issues after establishment of RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = 
situation worsened | int 
Variable #97 | Question #25 | indprobaother25 | level of other problems after establishment of 
RBO | 1 = no response,2 = situation same,3 = situation improved,4 = situation worsened | int 
Variable #98 | Question #26 | iadmblocal | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the local level before the creation of RBO| percentage| float 
Variable #99 | Question #26 | iadmbbasin | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the basin level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #100 | Question #26 | iadmbstate | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the statel level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #101 | Question #26 | iadmbgov | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the government level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #102 | Question #26 | ifinblocal | percentage of infrastructure financing decision making 
at the local level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #103 | Question #26 | ifinbbasin | percentage of infrastructure financing decision 
making at the basin level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #104 | Question #26 | ifinbstate | percentage of infrastructure financing decision making 
at the state level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #105 | Question #26 | ifinbgov | percentage of infrastructure financing decision making 
at the government level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #106 | Question #26 | ienfblocal | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the local level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #107 | Question #26 | ienfbbasin | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the basin level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #108 | Question #26 | ienfbstate | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the state level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float  60
Variable #109 | Question #26 | ienfbgov | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the government level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #110 | Question #26 | istdsblocal | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the local level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #111 | Question #26 | istdsbbasin | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the basin level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #112 | Question #26 | istdsbstate | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the state level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #113 | Question #26 | istdsbgov | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the government level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #114 | Question #26 | iotherblocal26 | percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the local level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #115 | Question #26 | iotherbbasin26 | percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the basin level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #116 | Question #26 | iotherbstate26 | percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the state level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #117 | Question #26 | iotherbgov26 | percentage of decision making for other 
responsibilities at the government level before the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #118 | Question #26 | iadmalocal | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the local level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #119 | Question #26 | iadmabasin | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the basin level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #120 | Question #26 | iadmastate | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the state level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #121 | Question #26 | iadmagov | percentage of water administration decision making 
at the government level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #122 | Question #26 | ifinalocal | percentage of water administration decision making at 
the local level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float  61
Variable #123 | Question #26 | ifinabasin | percentage of infrastructure financing decision 
making at the basin level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #124 | Question #26 | ifinastate| percentage of infrastructure financing decision making 
at the state level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #125 | Question #26 | ifinagov | percentage of infrastructure financing decision making 
at the government level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #126 | Question #26 | ienfalocal | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the local level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #127 | Question #26 | ienfabasin | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the basin level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #128 | Question #26 | ienfastate | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the state level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #129 | Question #26 | ienfagov | percentage of water quality enforcement decision 
making at the government level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #130 | Question #26 | istdsalocal | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the local level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #131 | Question #26 | istdsabasin | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the basin level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #132 | Question #26 | istdsastate | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the state level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #133 | Question #26 | istdsagov | percentage of the setting of water quality standards 
decision making at the government level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #134 | Question #26 | i_26_othername | other responsibilities |1 = Quality objectives,2 
= O & M,3 = Management,4 = Planning,5 = Water Supply | int 
Variable #135 | Question #26 | iotheralocal26 | percentage of the decision making for other 
responsibilities at the local level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #136 | Question #26 | iotherabasin26 | percentage of the decision making for other 
responsibilities at the basin level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float  62
Variable #137 | Question #26 | iotherastate26 | percentage of the decision making for other 
responsibilities at the state level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #138 | Question #26 | iotheragov26 | percentage of the decision making for other 
responsibilities at the government level after the creation of RBO | percentage| float 
Variable #139 | Question #27 | wrmibwatertypes | Water rights before RBO existence | 0 = 
None,1 = Permanent Rights,2 = Long-Term use concession (> 10 yrs),3 = Short-Term use 
concession (<10 yrs),4 = Permanent Transferable,5 = Permanent non-transferable | int 
Variable #140| Question #28 | wrmibresponsiblerigths | responsibility for awarding water rights 
before RBO existence | 0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 =,6 = River Basin Org. | int 
Variable #141 | Question #29 | wrmibresponsibleallocation | responsibility for water allocation 
before RBO existence |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int 
Variable #142 | Question #30 | wrmibresponsiblemodfore | responsibility for modeling and 
forecasting water availability before RBO existence |  |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 
= State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #143 | Question #31 | wrmibresponsiblemonit | responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality before RBO existence |   0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 
= State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #144 | Question #32 | wrmibresponsibletariff | responsibility for collecting tariffs 
before RBO existence |  |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int 
Variable #145 | Question #27 | wrmiawatertypes | Water rights after RBO existence | 0 = 
None,1 = Permanent Rights,2 = Long-Term use concession (> 10 yrs),3 = Short-Term use 
concession (<10 yrs),4 = Permanent Transferable,5 = Permanent non-transferable | int 
Variable #146 | Question #28 | wrmiaresponsiblerigths | responsibility for awarding water 
rights after RBO existence |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  63
Variable #147 | Question #29 | wrmiaresponsibleallocation | responsibility for water allocation 
before RBO existence |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = 
Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #148 | Question #30 | wrmiaresponsiblemodfore | responsibility for modeling and 
forecasting water availability after RBO existence |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #149 | Question #31 | wrmiaresponsiblemonit | responsibility for monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality after RBO existence |  0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = 
State/Provincial,4 = Regional Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #150 | Question #32 | wrmiaresponsibletariff | responsibility for collecting tariffs after 
RBO existence |    0 = n/a,1 = Federal,2 = National Agency,3 = State/Provincial,4 = Regional 
Organization,5 = Local Government,6 = River Basin Org. | int  
Variable #151 | Question #33 | wrmiuser1 | existence of water tariff on irrigation | 0 = n/a,1 = 
yes,2 = no | int 
Variable #152 | Question #33 | wrmiuser2 | existence of water tariff on industry | 0 = n/a,1 = 
yes,2 = no | int 
Variable #153| Question #33 | wrmiuser3 | existence of water tariff on domestic use | 0 = n/a,1 
= yes,2 = no | int 
Variable #154-156 | Question #33 | wrmi33other1user |  wrmi33other2user | 
wrmi33other3user | other user groups paying water tax | 0 = n/a,1 = electricity,2 = tertiary 
sector,3 = tourism,4 = fisheries,5 = thermal energy,6 = sewerage charges,7 = animal breeding, 8 = 
mining & oil | int 
Variable #157| Question #33 | wrmitariff1 | value of tariff (2002 USD) on irrigation | float 
Variable #158 | Question #33 | wrmitariff2 | value of tariff (2002 USD) on industry | float 
Variable #159 | Question #33 | wrmitariff3 | value of tariff (2002 USD) on domestic use | float 
Variable #160-162 | Question #33 | wrmi33other1tariff |  wrmi33other2tariff |  
wrmi33other3tariff | value of tariff (2002 USD) on other user groups | float  64
Variable #163 | Question #34 | wrmiusersgroup1 | (existence of) irrigation user group | 0 = 
n/a,1 = yes | int 
Variable #164 | Question #34 | wrmiusersgroup2 | (existence of) industry user group | 0 = 
n/a,1 = yes | int 
Variable #165 | Question #34 | wrmiusersgroup3 | (existence of) domestic user group | 0 = 
n/a,1 = yes | int 
Variable #166-168 | Question #34 | wrmi34other1usersgroup | wrmi34other2usersgroup | 
wrmi34other3usersgroup | other user groups identified | 0 = n/a,1 = electricity,2 = fish-
farming,3 = thermal energy,4 = animal breeding | int 
Variable #169 | Question #34 | wrmigroup1 | percentage of irrigation users who pay tariff | 
percent | float 
Variable #170 | Question #34 | wrmigroup2 | percentage of industry users who pay tariff | 
percent | float 
Variable #171 | Question #34 | wrmigroup3 | percentage of domestic users who pay tariff | 
percent | float 
Variable #172-174 | Question #34 | wrmi34other1group | wrmi34other2group |  
wrmi34other3group | percentage of other user groups who pay tariff | percent | float 
Variable #175 | Question #35 | wrmidestination | amount of tariff going to other destinations | 
percent | float 
Variable #176 | Question #36 | wrmiactivitiesprivate | extent of private sector activities | 
percent | float 
Variable #177 | Question #37 | wrmiinfostakeh | information sharing among stakeholders | 
string 
Variable #178 | Question #38 | wrmicapacitystakeh | capacity building for stakeholders | string 
 
Financing 
Variable #179 | Question #39 | fannualbudget | annual budget (million dollars per year) | float  65
Variable #180| Question #39 | fbudgetextagency | amount of budget allocated by external 
(government) agency | percent | float 
Variable #181 | Question #39 | fbudgetwhichagency | name of external agency | 0 = n/a,1 = 
Government,2 = SRBC,3 = Provincial,4 = Central Gov’t,5 = Hydrologic funds,6 = Env. Ministry,7 
= Fundo Hydricos,8 = Agric. Ministry,9 = BM,10 = BIRF | int 
Variable #182 | Question #39 | fbudgetstakeh  | amount of budget derived from basin 
stakeholders | percent | float 
Variable #183 | Question #39 | fbudgetothersources | amount of budget from other sources | 
percent | float 
Variable #184 | Question #40 | fbudgetinvestmentbasin | amount of budget used for 
investment in the basin | percent | float 
Variable #185 | Question #41 | fbudgetotheractivities | amount of budget used for other 
development activities | percent | float 
Variable #186 | Question #42 |fbudgetom | amount of budget used for O&M | percent | float 
Variable #187 | Question #43 | fbudgetwaterquality | amount of budget used for water quality 
activities : percent | float 
Variable #188 | Question #44 | fbudgetother | amount of budget used in other activities | 
percent | float 
Variable #189 | Question #44 | other44 | other activities | 1 = hydraulics,2 = hydrology,3 = 
communication,4 = national budget,5 = institutional cost,6 = personnel cost,7 = R & D,8 = 
education | int 
 
Performance Indicators 
Variable #190 | Question #45 | pigdpyesno | Does the basin measure GDP | 0 = no,1 = yes | 
int 
Variable #191-194 | Question #45 | piyear1 | piyear2 | piyear3 | piyear4 | year of GDP 
measurement | int  66
Variable #195-198 | Question #45 | pigdp1 | pigdp2 | pigdp3 | pigdp4 | GDP (millions per 
year) corresponding to given year | float 
Variable #199| Question #46 | pisector1 | (existence of) agricultural sector | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #200 | Question #46 | pisector2 | (existence of) forest sector | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #201 | Question #46 | pisector3 | (existence of) urban zones | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #202 | Question #46 | pisector4 | (existence of) Open Land | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #203-205 | Question #46 | pi46other1 | pi46other2 | pi46other3 | other sectors 
utilizing basin land area | 1 =vegetation de paramo,2 = non-vegetated,3 = irrigation,4 = arable 
land,5 = surface vegetation,6 = rural zones,7 = urban zones, 8 = parks,9 = water plan,10 = 
pisciculture,11 = reservoirs,12 = permanent crops,13 = non-permanent crops,14 = lakes,15 = 
grazing land | int 
Variable #206 | Question #46 | pibasinarea1 | basin land area utilized by agriculture sector | km
2 
| float 
Variable #207 | Question #46 | pibasinarea2 | basin land area utilized by forestry sector | km
2 | 
float 
Variable #208 | Question #46 | pibasinarea3 | basin land area utilized by urban zones | km
2 | 
float 
Variable #209 | Question #46 | pibasinarea4 | basin land area utilized by Open Land | km
2 | 
float 
Variable #210-212 | Question #46 | pibasinarea46other1 | pibasinarea46other2 | 
pibasinarea46other3 | 
Variable #213 | Question #47| piquality1 | Disolved Oxygen |0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #214 | Question #47 | piquality2 | PH | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #215 | Question #47 | piquality3 | Temperature | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #216 | Question #47 |  piquality4 | Conductivity | 0 = no,1 = yes | int 
Variable #217 | Question #47 |  piquality5 | Suspended Solids | 0 = no,1 = yes | int  67
Variable #218-219 | Question #47 |  pi47other1 | pi47other2 | other quality indicators |1 = odor 
& taste,2 = BOD5, COD,3 = Nutrients (TSS),4 = Ammonium,5 = salinity,6 = Nitrate itrogen,7 = 
Boron,8 = Calcium,9 = turbidity,10 = phosphorus,11 = oil,12 =Flourine,13 = chlorine,14 = 
TDS,15 = Residuals,16 = Zinc,17 = solids,18 = Iron | int 
Variable #220 | Question #47 | pivalue1 | Disolved Oxygen | mg/l | float 
Variable #221| Question #47 | pivalue2 | PH | float 
Variable #222 | Question #47| pivalue3 | Temperature | degree centigrade | float 
Variable #223 | Question #47 | pivalue4 | Conductivity | EC | float 
Variable #224 | Question #47 | pivalue5 | Suspended Solids | mg/l | float 
Variable #225-226 | Question #47| pi47other1value | pi47other2value | values for other quality 
indicators | float 
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Annex 3: Variables uded in the analysis 
Variables taken directly from the questionnaire 
GovrBdy=V31.  This variable distinguishes between level of governance of the RBO.   With Values 
ranging from 1-5, with higher ones expressing more decentralization.  It can be used as a dummy 
variable.   
PltclCost=V37.  This variable measures the political/transaction cost of the decentralization 
process.  It is expressed on a scale from 1-5, with 5 being the highest.  It can serve as an 
independent as well as a dependent variable.  As an independent variable it may explain low success 
or longer period of decentralization.  As a dependent variable it may be positively correlated with 
variables expressing the complexity of the basin. 
%BgtBsn=V182.  This variable measures the share of the budget obtained from basin stakeholders.  
It is expected that the higher BgtBsn the more likely the decentralization success. 
%BgtExtr=V180.  The share of the basin’s budget allocated by external (government) agency.  It is 
expected the higher the %BgtExtr the more likely the decentralization process to succeed. 
%BgtSrcs=PC(V180, V182, V183).  Share of budget from sources other than Government and 
Basin stakeholders.  It is expected that the more diverse the budget sources the more difficult it will 
be to implement the decentralization. 
FormsDispute1=V44.   The forums that are available to hear/solve disputes. 
FormsDisput2=V45.  This variable might have a pivotal role in explaining success of 
decentralization.  It measures, using a dichotomy variable Y=1; N=0 the existence of dispute 
resolution institutions.  It is expected that existence of such institutions be positively correlated with 
higher level of success of decentralization. 
GovrBdy=V31.  This variable distinguishes between level of governance of the RBO, with values 
ranging from 1-5, with higher ones expressing more centralization (5 = “Federal”,4 = “State 
Authority”’3 = “State owned company”,2 = “Regional Authority”,1 = “Regional 
Board/Council/Committee”). 
MtdCreatn=V33.  This variable indicates the way the RBO was created.  N/A=0, Bottom Up=1, 
and Top Down=2.  We expect that a bottom up method of creation is associated with more 
successful decentralization.  69
PltclCost=V37.  This variable measures the political/transaction cost of the decentralization 
process via the creation of new institutions (0 = none, 1=Low, …, 5=high). As an independent 
variable it may explain low success or longer period of decentralization.  As a dependent variable it 
may be positively correlated with variables expressing the complexity of the basin. 
RespWtrAlocAftr=V147.  This Variable measures administration of water allocation after the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrAlocBfr=V141.  This Variable measures administration of water allocation before the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrM&EQAftr=V149.  This Variable measures administration of monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality after the decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher 
level of decentralization. 
RespWtrM&EQBfr=V143.  This Variable measures administration of monitoring and 
enforcement of water quality before the decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher 
level of decentralization. 
RespWtrModlAftr=V148.  This Variable measures administration of water modeling after the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrModlBfr=V142.  This Variable measures administration of water modeling before the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrRightAftr=V146.  This Variable measures administration of water rights after the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrRightBfr=V140.  This Variable measures administration of water rights before the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization.  
RespWtrTarifAftr=V150.  This Variable measures administration of water tariff collection after the 
decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
RespWtrTarifBfr=V144.  This Variable measures administration of water tariff collection before 
the decentralization on a scale of 1-6 with 6 indicating a higher level of decentralization. 
ShareSW=V75.  This variable measures the share of surface water in the available water resources in 
the basin.  Lower values of ShareSW mean that other sources are the majority, and higher values of 
ShareSW mean that surface water is the majority.  In both cases, namely that one source prevails, it is  70
expected that it will be easier to manage the water in the basin compared to a situation where there 
are multiple sources.  Therefore, having all other factors constant, the relationship between this 
variable and the successful management of the RBO or the success of the decentralization process 
are hill shaped. 
WuasInvlv=V47.  This variable assesses the degree of WUA involvement and participation, 
expressed as a continuous variable on a scale between 0-100.  We expect that the higher the values 
of WuasInvlv, the higher the level of decentralization success. 
WuasNum=V49.  This variable indicates the total number of WUAs in the basin.  We expect that 
the higher WuasNum the higher the level of success of the RBO and the decentralization process. 
YrCreation=V18.  This variable measures the year in which the RBO was created.  The earlier the 
RBO creation, the stronger it is and thus the easier it is to achieve the decentralization process. 
YrsDecentral=V17. This variable measures the length of the decentralization process.  It can be 
either an independent or a dependent variable.  It is expected that the more complicated the process 
is the longer it takes to decentralize (independent), and the shorter the process the more successful 
the decentralization process (dependent). 
Variables that underwent Principal Component (PC) Analysis and expectations regarding 
their impact 
%UsrPay=PC(V169, V170, V171).  This PC variable measures the percentage of users in the 
irrigation, industrial, and urban sectors that pay their tariffs.  It is expected that higher values of 
UsrPay indicate a more likely decentralization process. 
ExistUsrGrp=PC(V163, V164, V165).  This PC variable is another way to measure participation in 
the basin.  Detecting the existence of irrigation, industrial and domestic user groups via dichotomy 
variables allows to expect that existence is likely to lead to successful process of decentralization. 
Facilities=PC(V50, V51, V52, V53).  This PC variable incorporates the values (length or quantity 
and capacity) of canals, reservoirs, dams and treatment facilities into one ‘facilities’ variable.  Because 
the measurement units of each of the variables comprising Facilities are on a different scale we may 
face problems in the PC variable.  However, we expect that an RBO with more infrastructure 
(higher level/number/capacity of Facilities) will face difficulties because of the claimed rights in the 
status quo, and may have lower level of success in decentralization.  71
ImprvRespons=PC(V146-V140, V147-V141, V148-V142, V149-V143, V150-V144).  This is a PC 
variable, taking into account the difference between ‘after and before’ decentralization regarding 5 
responsibilities.  The higher the value the more successful the decentralization.  ImprvRespons will 
serve as a dependent variable. 
IncrmntImprv=PC((V91-V83, V92-V84, V93-V85, V94-V86, V95-V87, V96-V88).).  This PC 
variable measures the incremental improvement in various problems in the basin between ‘before 
and after’ decentralization.  ??????????????? 
IncrmntTasks=PC(V118-V98, V199-V99, V122-V102, V123-V103, V126-V106, V127-V107, 
V130-V110, V131-V111).  This PC variable measures the incremental change in 8 variables 
measuring tasks at local and basin-level management between ‘before and after’ decentralization.  
The higher the value the more successful the decentralization.  IncrmntTasks will serve as a dependent 
variable. 
MainObj=PC(V19, V20, V21).  This is a Principal Component variable, comprising of three main 
objectives on the RBO-conflict resolution, flood control, and water scarcity improvement.  The 
higher the value of this variable, the more comprehensive the objective is.  We expect that holding 
other variables constant, the higher the value of MainObj the more complicated the process, leading 
to a lengthier decentralization and lower likelihood of success. 
MinrObj=PC(V22, V23, V24).  This PC variable, comprises of three minor objectives of the RBO-
a combination of a set of 25 possible minor objectives (See variables 22-24 in Annex 23).  We expect 
a similar relationship as for MainObj. 
PrblmsAftr=PC(V91, V92, V93, V94, V95, V96).  This PC variable measures composite success of 
decentralization.  No response=1, Situation improved=4, SameSame situation=3, Situation 
worsen=2.  (Originally it was: Same situation=2, Situation improved=3; Situation worsen=4, but re-
ordered.)  PrblmsAftr will serve as a dependent variable.   
PrblmsBfr=PC(V83, V84, V85, V86, V87, V88).  This PC variable measures composite level of 
problems in several domains related to management issues in the basin: flooding, water scarcity, 
environmental quality, water conflicts, land degradation, development issues.  All values are 
measured on the same scale (1-4), with 4 measuring severe problems.  The direction of impact of 
this variable is undecided.  On the one hand increased level of problems may provide incentive for 
the decentralization process, but on the other hand problems that are too severe may hamper the  72
decentralization process.  So, we expect a quadratic relationship between level of problems and level 
of success. 
SectrComposit=PC(V58, V59, V60, V61, V62).  This PC variable measures the composition of the 
subsectors in the basin—irrigation, industry, domestic, hydropower, environment, which expressed 
as Y=1 if the sector exist, and N=0 if the sector doesn’t exist in the basin.  We expect that the more 
sub-sectors are involved in water utilization the more difficult is the decentralization process. 
SectrUseShars=PC(V66, V67, V68, V69, V70).  This PC variable takes into account the 
distribution of water use shares of the five main water using sectors-irrigation, industry, domestic, 
hydropower and environment.  We expect that the more skewed the distribution the easier it will be 
to decentralize the RBO, because of power relations between the sectors. 
SuccObj1=PC(V25, …, V30).  This PC variables captures the integrated level of success of the 
three main objectives and the other 25 minor objectives, each measured on a scale of 1-5 with 5 
indicating high level of success.  SuccObj1 will serve as a dependent variable. 
SuccObj2=PC(V25, …, V27).  This PC variable, measuring the success of only the 3 main 
objectives, is constructed because we are afraid that there are not enough observations that 
distinguish among the minor objectives. It is measured on the same scale as SuccObj1.  SuccObj2 will 
serve as a dependent variable. 
Indices created 
%BgtSpnt=V184+V185+V186+V187.  This variable measures the share of the budget that is spent 
in the basin and not returned to external governments.  It is expected that higher values of BgtSpnt 
are likely to indicate a higher level of success. 
AdminBasnImprv=V199-V99.  This variable measures the increase in share of administrative 
responsibilities at basin level. 
AdmnLocalImprv=V118-V98.  This variable measures the increase in share of administrative 
responsibilities at local level. 
BgtPrCpta=V179/V11.  This variable expresses budget per capita in the basin.  It is expected that 
higher values are associated with likely success of the decentralization process. 
InfrBasnImprv=V123-V103.  This variable measures the increase in share of infrastructure 
financing at basin level.  73
InfrLocalImprv=V122-V102.  This variable measures the increase in share of infrastructure 
financing at local level. 
InstCng.  This is a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not there was an institutional 
change associated with the decentralization process. If (V146-V140≥1, OR V147-V141≥1, OR 
V148-V142≥1, OR V149-V143≥1, OR V150-V144≥1) Then InstCng=1, Otherwise InstCng=0.  
InstCng will be used as a dependent variable. 
QenfBasnImprv=V127-V107.  This variable measures the increase in share of water quality 
enforcement at basin level. 
QenfLocalImprv=V126-V106.  This variable measures the increase in share of water quality 
enforcement at local level. 
QstdBasnImprv=V131-V111.  This variable measures the increase in share of water quality 
standard setting at basin level. 
QstdLocalImprv=V130-V110.  This variable measures the increase in share of water quality 
standard setting at local level. 
Scarcity1=V13/V14. This variable reflects one measure of scarcity, measured as the ratio between 
rainfall and evapotranspiration [millimeter/millimeter].  We expect that, holding other thing 
constant, higher levels of Scarcity1 will be positively correlated with success of reform, and negatively 
correlated with length of reform. 
Scarcity2=V15/V12. This variable measures available water resources per person residing in the 
basin [m
3/person].  We expect Scarcity2 to behave in a similar way to Scarcity1.  74
Annex 4: River Basin Organization Survey 
 
Dear Survey Respondent:  
This survey is part of a research project which tries to assess in which way the creation of Riverbasin 
Organizations leads to decentralization of water resources management to other – lower - levels of 
decision making. The research project also tries to assess in which way the creation of Riverbasin 
Organizations leads to improved water resources management results.  
  The specific information (in the box below) regarding each individual basin will be kept in 
confidentiality not to allow identification of the Riverbasin Organization. 
  The results of the research effort will be made publicly available and hopefully help in the 
worldwide effort to bring about sustainable integrated water resources management.  
  If you find you have not enough space to fill out the questionnaire, you can expand the 
sections in this Word document or provide annexing sheets.  
 
Your collaboration in this effort is highly appreciated. 
The survey can be found in: www.worldbank.org/riverbasinmanagement  
or directly by clicking on: 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/rdvsurveys.nsf/home?OpenView   75
 
River Basin Organization Survey 
 
 





RBO Name:  
 
RBO Address:  
 
Contact 












2. Institutional Setup  
1. Basin area (square km): 
   
2. Population Total: 
  % Rural:   
3. Annual precipitation (mm): 
   
4. Annual evapotranspiration (mm): 
   
5. Water resources in the basin  
(Million cubic meters per year):     
6. No. of Countries that Share the Basin:  
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7. Period (years) that decentralization took 
place:      
8. Year of RBO creation: 
   
9. What are the main objectives of the RBO: 
 
 
                                                                                                                            1-Other:  2-Other:  
10. Measure success against objectives (scale 1-5):  













    
 
11. Governing body of the River basin 









Explain:   
O N/A 
O Flood Control 
O N/A 




O 1 (0% success) 
O 2 (25% success) 
O 3 (50% success) 
O 4 (75% success) 
O 5 (100% success) 
O N/A 
O 1 (0% success) 
O 2 (25% success) 
O 3 (50% success) 
O 4 (75% success) 
O 5 (100% success) 
O N/A 
O 1 (0% success) 
O 2 (25% success) 
O 3 (50% success) 
O 4 (75% success) 
O 5 (100% success) 
O N/A 
O 1 (0% success) 
O 2 (25% success) 
O 3 (50% success) 
O 4 (75% success) 
O 5 (100% success) 
O N/A 
O 1 (0% success) 
O 2 (25% success) 
O 3 (50% success) 
O 4 (75% success) 
O 5 (100% success) 
O N/A 
O Federal 
O State Authority 
O State owned Company 
O Regional Authority 
O Regional Board/Council/Committee   77
























13. Laws of the land and decrees that 
govern the RBO:    








15. Existing institutions that had to be 
dismantled in the decentralization process:    
O N/A 
O Federal Government 
O State  
O Local Government 
O Users 
O N/A 
O Federal Government 
O State  
O Local Government 
O Users 
O N/A 
O Federal Government 
O State  




O Top-Down   78
16. New institutions that had to be created 
in the decentralization process:    
17. Cost of decentralization process(e.g. 
creation of new institutions, etc): 















3-Other:     
 
 
   
18. Are there forums to hear disputes, how 







19. Main types of disputes/issues that 
usually need to be resolved (Water Quality, 
Waste Disposal, Deforestation, Erosion, 
Agriculture Practices, Basin Infrastructure, 
Groundwater Pollution, Flood, etc.) 
 
O None  O 3 
O 1  O 4 
O 2 O5
O None  O 3 
O 1  O 4 
O 2 O5
O None  O 3 
O 1  O 4 
O 2 O5
O None  O 3 




O No  79
20. Have water user associations been 
established: How many: What is their 
degree of involvement:  
 
                                     How many associations?    
 
Percentage of involvement (0%-100%):   
21. What are the types of infrastructure in 
the basin:  









1-Other:     
2-Other:       
 
22. User types and share of use of the Basin's water:  











1-Other:     
O N/A 
O Yes 
O No  80
2-Other:     
3-Other:     
 
23. Organigram - Please attached the RBO organigram. 
Attach your file here:  
 
24. Share of types of water. Percentage (%) of users that use:  
Types of Water  Percentage (0-100%) 
Groundwater Only: 
 
Surface Water Only: 
 
Both Groundwater and Surface Water: 
 
1-Other:     
2-Other:     
3-Other:       81
 
25. Indicators of problems before and after establishment of the RBO (check all that apply): 
Water Resources Problems in the Basin  Before  After 



































O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened   82







26. Responsibilities for decision making Before and After the creation of the RBO. Please indicate the share of decision making for the following areas (0-
100%):  
Before the creation of the RBO  After the creation of the RBO  Responsibility 
for:  % at local level 
(e.g 
municipality)  
% at Basin level % at state/ 
provin-cial gov. 
level 
% at national 
gov. level 
% at local level 
(e.g 
municipality) 
% at Basin level % at 
state/provincial 
gov. level 





























       
O No response 
O No problem 
O Some problem 
O Severe problem 
O No response 
O Situation same 
O Situation improved 
O Situation worsened 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 


















       
 
 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100% 
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%
O N/A  O 50% 
O 0%    O 60% 
O 10%  O 70% 
O 20%  O 80% 
O 30%  O 90% 
O 40%  O 100%  84
3. Water Resource Management Instruments 
Compare the situation before and after the existence of the RBO:  
  Before RBO  After RBO 
27. Existence of water right types (e.g. concessions, 



























































O Permanent Rights 
O Long-Term Use Concession (more than 10 years) 
O Short-Term Use Concession (less than 10 years) 
O Permanent Transferable 
O Permanent Non-Transferable 
O None 
O Permanent Rights 
O Long-Term Use Concession (more than 10 years) 
O Short-Term Use Concession (less than 10 years) 
O Permanent Transferable 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 
O River Basin Organization   85






















31. Who is responsible for monitoring and 














































O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 




O Local Government 
O Regional Organization 
O National Agency 
O River Basin Organization   86
33. Water Tariff (if possible provide rates for various major uses):  







1-Other:     
2-Other:     
3-Other:     
 
34. Percent of users paying tariffs:  
User Group  Percentage who pay 












O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%  87


























O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%  88
 
35. Which percentage of the tariff payments stays in the basin and which percentage goes to other destinations? Which destinations? 




Other Destinations:  
 
 
Which Destination:   
 
36. Extent/activities of private sector involvement in basin investments (e.g. water supply, water treatment, reservoir construction, basin infrastructure 
maintenance): 
Percent Private Involvement:  
 
 
 Explain:   
 
37. Information sharing among all stakeholders (meetings, annual reports, websites): 
 
 
38. Capacity building for stakeholders (e.g. training courses, seminars, study tours): 
 
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100% 
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100% 
O N/A     O 50% 
O 0%       O 60% 
O 10%     O 70% 
O 20%     O 80% 
O 30%     O 90% 
O 40%     O 100%  89
 
Financing: 
39. Annual Budget (million dollars per year): 
 
% budget allocated by external (government) 
agency:  
Provide name of external agency: 
 
% budget derived from stakeholders in river 
basins:  
% budget derived from other sources:
 
 
40. % budget used for investment in the Basin: 
 
41. % budget used for other development 
activities:   
42. % budget used for O&M: 
 
43. % budget used for water quality activities: 
 
44. % budget used for other: 
 
 
   90
Performance Indicators 
 
45. Do you measure your basin's GDP?  
Yes  No 
If Yes, please indicate the basin's yearly GDP (million US dollars per year):  
Year  GDP (millions per year) 
0-10; 11-30; 31-70; 71-100; 
+ 100 millions per year 
   
   
   
46. Basin land area utilized by various sectors:  









1-Other:     
 
2-Other:     
 
3-Other:     
   91
 
47. Various water quality indicators used in your Riverbasin:  











1-Other:     
 
2-Other:     
 
3-Other:     
 
 
48. Reduction in loss of production or productivity due to water scarcity or flooding: Describe verbally for the various sectors the situation before and after 
decentralization: 
 
49. Number of disputes over water allocations or water quality before and after creation of the RBO: 
 
50.Any other comments or clarifications including annexed material you think may be of value: 
 